Will the Bribe to Kagame Be Enough to Stop Him from Attacking the DRC?

Critical Analysis of the Washington Accords and Defense of Congolese Sovereignty.

Introduction

For several years, tensions between the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Rwanda have experienced ups and downs, but the constant remains the same: Kigali continues to exert a destabilizing influence on Congolese territory, particularly through military and logistical support to the M23 rebel movement.

Despite multiple international mediations, notably those from Washington and Doha, genuine peace remains a mirage. Recently, a major diplomatic turning point has attracted attention: the Washington Accords, supposedly aimed at relaunching cooperation between the DRC and Rwanda under U.S. supervision.

However, behind this facade of economic dialogue and regional integration lies a much more cynical reality. This project looks more like a diplomatic bribe offered to Paul Kagame to dissuade him from continuing his aggression against the DRC, rather than a genuine peace initiative.

The central question is crucial: will a bribe, even in the form of an economic agreement, be enough to curb Rwanda's ambitions on Congolese soil?

1. The Context of the Washington Accords

1.1 The DRC's Original Initiative

These accords follow an initiative by the DRC, which, as a sovereign country, had approached the United States of America to seek a bilateral strategic partnership. Kinshasa's objective was clear:

• Obtain military, technological and security support in exchange for economic cooperation
• Establish a partnership around critical minerals — notably cobalt, lithium and coltan — essential for the global energy transition
• Develop local processing capacities and mining infrastructure

1.2 The Transformation Imposed by Washington

But instead of accepting this bilateral partnership, Washington chose a more complex path: introducing Rwanda into the discussion, under the pretext of promoting regional integration and economic stability in the Great Lakes.

For the Congolese, this was a profound shock. How can one imagine economic integration with a country that:

• Continues to militarily occupy part of their territory
• Actively supports a murderous rebellion responsible for thousands of deaths
• Systematically pillages Congolese natural resources
• Commits massive human rights violations documented by the UN and international organizations

1.3 The DRC's Legitimate Refusal

The DRC, justifiably, has refused to sign any integration agreement as long as Rwandan troops remain on Congolese soil. This refusal is:

• An affirmation of national sovereignty
• An implicit denunciation of U.S. policy, deemed compliant toward Kigali
• An act of dignity consistent with international law that prohibits the normalization of an occupation.

2. An Ambiguous and Cynical American Strategy

2.1 Priority to Geoeconomic Interests

The United States claims to want to bring peace and encourage development in the Great Lakes region. However, their current approach seems more guided by geoeconomic interests than by a sincere desire for stability.

By integrating Rwanda into these discussions, Washington primarily seeks to secure the supply chain of strategic minerals without antagonizing either partner.

American perception is deeply biased:

• Rwanda is perceived as a stable, disciplined and pro-Western ally
• The DRC is seen as a fragile giant, corrupt and militarily weak

2.2 The Disturbing Message: Rewarding the Aggressor

Thus, the implicit message is deeply disturbing: reward the aggressor to obtain peace.

This logic of "stabilization through compromise" recalls past agreements in other conflict zones where the international community preferred to accommodate perpetrators rather than support victims.

Behind the facade of regional cooperation, Rwanda pulls the strings. By accepting to participate in these discussions, it receives:

• Renewed diplomatic legitimacy
• Privileged access to the economic benefits of Congolese minerals
• The ability to continue supporting M23 on the ground while negotiating.

3. Rwanda: An Actor with Clear and Documented Ambitions

3.1 The Obsession with Eastern DRC

Paul Kagame has never hidden his obsession with Eastern DRC. Since the end of the Rwandan genocide in 1994, the Kigali regime has justified its military incursions by the presence of Hutu militias who took refuge in Congo.

But this justification no longer holds. The real motivation is economic and geostrategic.

3.2 Systematic Pillaging of Resources

Kivu, rich in coltan, gold and cassiterite, represents a considerable source of wealth. Several reports from the United Nations, Human Rights Watch and the International Crisis Group have documented the illegal exploitation of these resources by networks linked to the Rwandan army.

Established facts:

• Rwanda exports minerals it does not produce
• These minerals come from Congolese mines under M23 control
• Exports occur with false Rwandan certificates of origin
• Revenues directly finance M23 military operations

3.3 M23: Instrument of Pressure and Blackmail

For Kigali, controlling this region, even indirectly, means strengthening its economic and political power in the Great Lakes region.

M23 acts as an instrument of pressure and blackmail, allowing Rwanda to obtain diplomatic or economic concessions with each negotiation cycle.

Thus, even if Washington offers an integration agreement and economic benefits, this will not be enough to curb Kigali's expansionist ambitions. Rwanda will not renounce an economic rent that depends on the DRC's weakness.

4. A Disguised Diplomatic "Bribe"

4.1 A Policy of "Purchased Peace"

Calling this agreement a "bribe" is not an exaggeration. In practice, the United States offers Rwanda an economic and political reward in exchange for supposedly peaceful behavior.

This approach recalls "peace purchase" policies often used during the Cold War: stabilizing allied authoritarian regimes, even if they violate human rights, as long as they serve Western strategic interests.

4.2 Serious and Predictable Consequences

But this method has serious consequences:

1. It weakens Congolese sovereignty by transforming the DRC into a mere geostrategic pawn
2. It encourages Rwandan impunity by showing that aggression is profitable
3. It normalizes military aggression as an acceptable negotiation tactic
4. It creates a dangerous precedent: to be heard or rewarded by the international community, one need only sow chaos and then negotiate peace in exchange for economic advantages.

5. The DRC's Position of Weakness

5.1 Military and Diplomatic Vulnerability

The DRC, despite its size and natural wealth, remains militarily and diplomatically vulnerable:

• Its army is poorly equipped, infiltrated and dependent on foreign aid
• Diplomatically, Kinshasa struggles to impose its voice in major Western capitals
• Kigali has a well-established network of influence in think tanks, NGOs and international financial institutions

5.2 A Courageous but Isolating Act

The DRC's refusal to sign the integration agreement is a courageous act, but it also reveals Kinshasa's isolation.

By refusing this "rigged deal," the Congolese government exposes itself to economic and diplomatic pressures from Western powers, which can:

• Reduce their development aid
• Slow down investments
• Exert pressure through international financial institutions

5.3 Why Yielding Would Be Worse

However, yielding to pressure would be even worse. Signing an agreement while Rwandan troops occupy Kivu would amount to:

• Normalizing foreign occupation
• Legitimizing the economic annexation of this strategic region
• Sacrificing national dignity on the altar of the diplomacy of the powerful.

6. Long-Term Consequences of an Unjust Compromise

6.1 Temporary and Illusory Peace

Even if Rwanda temporarily agreed to reduce its military operations in exchange for economic benefits, this peace would only be a tactical respite.

The root causes of the conflict would remain intact:

• The struggle for resources
• International impunity
• Foreign interference
• Structural imbalances in the region

6.2 Lasting Weakening of the Congolese State

In the long term, such a compromise risks further weakening the Congolese state.

By entrusting an aggressor with a role in the economic or regional management of the attacked country, the United States contributes to a structural imbalance that feeds cycles of violence.

Rwanda, strengthened by its economic and diplomatic gains, could:

• Strengthen its regional influence
• Continue to operate in the shadows
• Present itself as a model partner of the international community while pursuing its agenda.

7. An Unnecessary Economic Structure: CEPGL Already Exists

7.1 An Ignored African Framework

The most serious aspect of this affair is that this new "regional integration structure" was not even necessary.

Since 1976, the region has already had a cooperation framework: the Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries (CEPGL), which brings together the DRC, Rwanda and Burundi.

7.2 CEPGL's Mandate and Objectives

This organization was created precisely to:

• Promote economic cooperation
• Ensure collective security
• Foster equitable development among the three countries

7.3 Why Bypass CEPGL?

Instead of strengthening this existing African structure — which respects the principle of equality among states — the United States preferred to invent a parallel framework, piloted from Washington and dominated by Kigali.

This approach:

• Marginalizes Burundi, yet a stakeholder in the region
• Sidelines existing African mechanisms in favor of external interference
• Reduces the DRC to a mere resource supplier rather than a sovereign partner

Supporting CEPGL would have allowed cooperation based on transparency and regional solidarity. But by imposing a new and imbalanced mechanism, Washington chose to favor Rwanda, transforming a peace project into an instrument of interference.

8. Rwandan Corruption: A Weapon of External Influence

8.1 International Lobbying

Rwanda has long understood that war is not waged solely with weapons, but also with money.

Kigali devotes considerable resources to purchasing influence relays abroad:

• Politicians and lobbyists in Western capitals
• Influential journalists and media outlets
• Think tanks and research institutes
• Certain religious figures and opinion leaders

8.2 Objective: Shape Image and Create Allies

This strategic corruption aims to:

• Shape a flattering image of Kagame's regime
• Create a network of allies capable of defending Kigali on the international stage
• Neutralize critics and independent investigations
• Influence political decisions of major powers

8.3 Infiltration Within the DRC

The DRC itself is not spared. In certain Congolese religious circles, influential voices — often manipulated by donations and promises from Kigali — minimize Rwandan crimes under the pretext of preaching peace and reconciliation.

But this selective "reconciliation" serves Kagame's interests:

• It weakens Congolese national consciousness
• It diverts legitimate popular anger
• It divides society and sows moral confusion

Thus, Rwandan corruption does not merely buy silence: it finances moral confusion, a formidable weapon that complements military aggression.

9. Rwanda: A Sustainable War Economy

9.1 The Rent of War

Rwanda does not seek peace: it seeks the rent of war.

M23 and other armed groups it supports in Kivu serve to maintain a parallel mining exploitation economy:

• Congolese minerals transit clandestinely to Rwanda
• They are then exported under Rwandan label
• Up to 40% of Rwandan coltan and gold exports actually come from Congo

9.2 The Bribe Changes Nothing

Thus, even if Rwanda received economic benefits under the U.S. agreements, it would not abandon this underground economy.

Washington's "bribe" would only add a legal revenue source alongside illegal pillaging.

In other words, these agreements would not change Kagame's strategy — they would reinforce it.

10. The Only Solution: Firmness and Sovereignty

10.1 Asserting National Sovereignty

The DRC must continue to assert its sovereignty. The refusal to sign an agreement while foreign troops occupy its territory is an act of national dignity.

10.2 A Clear Regional and International Strategy

But this resistance must be accompanied by a clear strategy:

A. Strengthen African alliances

• Consolidate ties with SADC and ECCAS countries that share the vision of a sovereign and peaceful Africa
• Revitalize CEPGL as the natural framework for cooperation
• Mobilize the African Union for verification and sanctions mechanisms

B. Diversify economic partnerships

• Turn to other emerging powers (China, India, Brazil, Turkey)
• Reduce dependence on Washington and Western capitals
• Develop South-South partnerships based on mutual respect

C. Invest in a reformed army

• Professionalize security forces
• Improve equipment and training
• Fight infiltration and corruption within the army
• Strengthen border and national resource protection capabilities

D. Mobilize the diaspora and civil society

• Raise global awareness about the reality of the conflict
• Counter Rwandan propaganda and international lobbying
• Create solidarity networks in universities, media and institutions
• Document crimes and prepare legal files for international justice

E. Denounce corruption of influence

• Identify and expose local actors compromised by Kigali
• Strengthen transparency in religious institutions and civil society
• Educate the population about manipulation and division tactics.

11. Conclusion: A Bribe Will Never Be Enough to Buy Peace

11.1 Peace Is Not Negotiated with Aggressors

Peace is not negotiated with aggressors, it is built on justice, truth and sovereignty.

Rwanda has never shown sincere willingness to ease tensions: each truce has been used to reposition militarily or diplomatically.

11.2 The Fire Continues to Burn

Thus, offering Kagame economic benefits in the form of an integration agreement amounts to paying the silence of an arsonist without extinguishing the fire he started.

As long as Rwanda perceives an economic and strategic interest in maintaining instability in Eastern Congo, no agreement, however well negotiated, will put a lasting end to the aggression.

11.3 Refuse Compromises That Sacrifice Dignity

The DRC must refuse compromises that sacrifice its dignity and resources on the altar of the diplomacy of the powerful.

Only by remaining firm and mobilizing its people and sincere allies can the country hope one day to turn the page on aggression and build genuine peace, based on:

• Mutual respect among sovereign nations
• Justice for victims
• An end to international impunity
• Equitable regional cooperation

11.4 Final Message

The bribe to Kagame will not be enough to stop him from attacking the DRC.

For three decades, the Democratic Republic of Congo has been the victim of recurrent aggression carried out by Rwanda under Paul Kagame's regime. Behind the speeches of peace and regional integration lies a cynical strategy: weaken Congo to better exploit its wealth.

The Congolese position is clear and non-negotiable:

• No economic integration without territorial integrity
• No cooperation without justice
• No peace without respect for sovereignty

Lasting peace will not come from Washington or Doha, but from:

• Congolese resistance
• International justice
• African solidarity
• Firmness in defending principles

Because genuine peace is not negotiated: it is conquered in dignity, and it can never be bought with the blood of the innocent.

References and Sources

United Nations Reports

1. United Nations Security Council (2024). Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo. S/2024/432. New York: United Nations.
2. United Nations Security Council (2023). Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo. S/2023/990. New York: United Nations.
3. United Nations Security Council (2022). Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo. S/2022/479. New York: United Nations.
4. United Nations Security Council (2013). Letter dated 15 November 2012 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee concerning the DRC. S/2012/843. New York: United Nations. [Report documenting Rwanda's support to M23]
5. OCHA (2024). Democratic Republic of the Congo: Humanitarian Snapshot. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.
6. UNHCR (2024). Democratic Republic of the Congo Operational Update. Geneva: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

Human Rights Organizations

7. Human Rights Watch (2024). "DR Congo: M23 Rebels Commit War Crimes". New York: Human Rights Watch.
8. Human Rights Watch (2023). "DR Congo: Surge in Killings, Abuses by Armed Groups". New York: Human Rights Watch.
9. Human Rights Watch (2012). "DR Congo: Rwanda Should Stop Aiding War Crimes Suspect". New York: Human Rights Watch.
10. Amnesty International (2023). "Democratic Republic of the Congo: 'I don't know why they killed us' - Unlawful killings by armed groups in eastern DRC". London: Amnesty International.
11. Amnesty International (2022). "Democratic Republic of the Congo: War crimes and crimes against humanity in Ituri". AFR 62/5432/2022.

Think Tanks and Research Centers

12. International Crisis Group (2024). "Eastern Congo: The Rwanda-M23 Alliance Threatens Regional Stability". Africa Report N°321. Brussels: ICG.
13. International Crisis Group (2023). "Peace in the DRC: The M23's Second Coming". Africa Briefing N°182. Brussels: ICG.
14. International Crisis Group (2022). "The Dark Side of Congo's Mineral Trade". Africa Report N°309. Brussels: ICG.
15. Enough Project (2024). "The Cost of Conflict: Understanding the Impact of Violence in Eastern Congo". Washington DC: The Enough Project.
16. Congo Research Group, Center on International Cooperation, NYU (2023). "Inside the ADF Rebellion: A Glimpse into the Life and Operations of a Secretive Jihadi Armed Group". New York: New York University.
17. Institute for Security Studies (2024). "Armed conflict and regional stability in the Great Lakes". ISS Policy Brief. Pretoria: ISS Africa.

Academic Studies

18. Stearns, Jason K. (2021). The War That Doesn't Say Its Name: The Unending Conflict in the Congo. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
19. Autesserre, Séverine (2010). The Trouble with the Congo: Local Violence and the Failure of International Peacebuilding. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
20. Van Reybrouck, David (2014). Congo: The Epic History of a People. New York: HarperCollins.
21. Nest, Michael, François Grignon, and Emizet F. Kisangani (2006). The Democratic Republic of Congo: Economic Dimensions of War and Peace. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
22. Reyntjens, Filip (2009). The Great African War: Congo and Regional Geopolitics, 1996-2006. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Natural Resources Reports

23. IPIS (2024). "Mapping Conflict Motives: Eastern DRC". International Peace Information Service. Antwerp: IPIS.
24. Global Witness (2022). "Digging for Transparency: How U.S. companies are only scratching the surface of conflict mineral reporting". London: Global Witness.
25. BGR (2023). "Mineral Certification in the Great Lakes Region: Annual Report". Bundesanstalt für Geowissenschaften und Rohstoffe. Hannover: BGR.
26. OECD (2023). "OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas". Paris: OECD Publishing.

Official and Governmental Documents

27. Democratic Republic of Congo (2024). "Memorandum on the security situation in Eastern DRC". Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Kinshasa.
28. African Union (2024). "Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Situation in the Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo". Addis Ababa: African Union Commission.
29. SADC (2024). "SADC Mission in the DRC (SAMIDRC): Status Report". Southern African Development Community. Gaborone: SADC Secretariat.
30. East African Community (2023). "Report of the East African Regional Force in the DRC". Arusha: EAC Secretariat.

Regional Organizations

31. ICGLR (2024). "Report on the implementation of the Pact on Security, Stability and Development in the Great Lakes Region". International Conference on the Great Lakes Region. Bujumbura.
32. CEPGL (2023). "Strategic Plan 2023-2027". Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries. Gisenyi: Permanent Executive Secretariat.
33. International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (2006). "Pact on Security, Stability and Development in the Great Lakes Region". Nairobi: ICGLR.

Humanitarian Reports

34. Médecins Sans Frontières (2024). "Democratic Republic of Congo: MSF activities report". Geneva: MSF International.
35. International Rescue Committee (2008). "Mortality in the Democratic Republic of Congo: An Ongoing Crisis". New York: IRC.
36. Save the Children (2023). "Children at Risk: The Impact of Conflict on Children in Eastern DRC". London: Save the Children International.

Media and Investigative Journalism

37. Reuters (2024). "M23 rebels advance in eastern Congo despite international pressure". Thomson Reuters.
38. The Guardian (2024). "'People are dying': inside the war-torn DRC where millions are displaced". Guardian Media Group.
39. Le Monde (2024). "En RDC, la guerre invisible pour le contrôle des minerais". Le Monde.
40. BBC Africa Eye (2023). "Rwanda and the DRC: Decades of Conflict". Documentary investigation. BBC.
41. Al Jazeera (2024). "The Fight for Congo's Minerals". Al Jazeera Media Network.

Legal Reports

42. International Court of Justice (2005). "Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda)". ICJ Reports 2005. The Hague: ICJ.
43. International Criminal Court (2024). "Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo". The Hague: ICC.
44. International Criminal Court (2012). "Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo". ICC-01/04-01/06. The Hague: ICC.

Conflict Minerals

45. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (2023). "Conflict Minerals Report Statistics". Washington DC: SEC.
46. European Commission (2023). "Regulation (EU) 2017/821 on Conflict Minerals: Implementation Report". Brussels: European Commission.
47. ITSCI (2024). "ITSCI Governance Report: Great Lakes Region". ITRI Tin Supply Chain Initiative. London: ITSCI.

Lobbying and Influence

48. OpenSecrets (2024). "Foreign Lobbying: Rwanda". Center for Responsive Politics.
49. Transparency International (2023). "Corruption Perceptions Index 2023". Berlin: Transparency International.
50. Global Witness (2018). "Regime Change: How Rwanda's Government is Using a U.S. Lobbying Firm to Discredit Critics". London: Global Witness.

Energy Transition and Critical Minerals

51. International Energy Agency (2024). "Critical Minerals Market Review 2024". Paris: IEA.
52. World Bank (2023). "Climate-Smart Mining: Minerals for Climate Action in the Democratic Republic of Congo". Washington DC: World Bank Group.
53. U.S. Geological Survey (2024). "Mineral Commodity Summaries 2024: Cobalt". Reston: USGS.

Religious Organizations

54. CENCO (2024). "Message on the situation in the East of the country". National Episcopal Conference of Congo. Kinshasa: CENCO.
55. World Council of Churches (2023). "Declaration on the humanitarian crisis in DRC". Geneva: WCC.
56. LICOCO (2024). "Annual report on governance in DRC". Congolese League Against Corruption. Kinshasa: LICOCO.

U.S. Official Sources

57. U.S. Department of State (2024). "U.S. Relations with Democratic Republic of the Congo: Bilateral Relations Fact Sheet". Washington DC.
58. U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (2023). "Hearing on U.S. Policy Toward Central Africa". Washington DC: U.S. Senate.
59. Congressional Research Service (2024). "The Democratic Republic of Congo: Background and U.S. Policy". Washington DC: Library of Congress.

Diaspora and Civil Society

60. Congolese Diaspora Council (2024). "Position on the Washington Accords". Circular document.
61. COJESKI (2024). "Manifesto of Congolese youth for national sovereignty". Collective of Youth Organizations of Congo. Kinshasa.

Prepared par :

Sam Nkumi, Chris Thomson & Gilberte  Bienvenue

African Rights Alliance, London, UK