Paul Kagame's Victimisation Strategy: How Rwanda's Leader Leverages Genocide Memory to Consolidate Power

Introduction

Paul Kagame, Rwanda's president since 1994, has strategically utilised the memory of the 1994 Tutsi genocide to maintain political control domestically and secure international support. This analysis examines how Kagame's government has constructed a narrative that positions him as Rwanda's protector whilst simultaneously suppressing alternative perspectives on the country's complex history of ethnic violence. By monopolising the genocide narrative, Kagame has established a governance model that Western powers have largely accepted despite growing concerns about human rights abuses and regional interventionism.

Weaponising Historical Memory for Political Control

Kagame's leadership legitimacy rests heavily on a carefully curated narrative about Rwanda's traumatic past. While official accounts present him simply as the military leader who ended the genocide, critics and historians point to a far more complex reality. Kagame's RPF forces initiated the civil war by invading Rwanda from Uganda in October 1990, setting in motion the chain of events that ultimately culminated in the genocide (Lemarchand, 2013).

Multiple scholars and former UN officials have argued that Kagame's primary objective was to secure full political power without compromise or power-sharing with the government he was fighting (Prunier, 2009; Rever, 2018). Ending the genocide, according to this perspective, was secondary to his political ambitions. Evidence supporting this view includes the RPF's rejection of ceasefire proposals during the height of the killings and their strategic military movements that focused on territorial control rather than rescuing civilians in immediate danger (Davenport & Stam, 2009).

Former UN Force Commander Roméo Dallaire's writings suggest that the RPF leadership under Kagame appeared willing to accept Tutsi casualties as the "cost" of their eventual military victory and total control of Rwanda (Dallaire, 2004). This supports the argument that Kagame's forces strategically opposed certain forms of international intervention that might have saved lives but would have required political compromise or power-sharing arrangements.

This historical complexity is systematically erased from Rwanda's official narrative, which instead promotes what critics have termed a "hero syndrome" — positioning Kagame as the country's saviour whilst obscuring his role in the events leading to the catastrophe and his apparent prioritisation of power over civilian protection. This selective historical account has provided a powerful foundation for his political legitimacy and has been institutionalised through several mechanisms:

1. Criminalising Political Opposition

The Rwandan government has established legal frameworks that effectively criminalise meaningful political opposition. Laws against "genocide ideology" and "divisionism" are written with such ambiguity that they can be selectively applied to silence critics (Human Rights Watch, 2021).

• Opposition figures such as Victoire Ingabire, who attempted to acknowledge both Tutsi and Hutu victims in a 2010 speech, received a 15-year prison sentence (later pardoned after international pressure).
• Diane Rwigara, who sought to challenge Kagame in the 2017 presidential election, was arrested on charges of forgery and inciting insurrection after questioning government policies (Amnesty International, 2018).
• The 2021 disappearance of opposition politician Boniface Twagirimana remains unresolved, reflecting a pattern of intimidation against political challengers.

According to Freedom House's 2023 report, Rwanda scores just 22/100 on its Global Freedom Index, categorising it as "not free" due to severe restrictions on political rights and civil liberties.

2. Cultivating the "Saviour" Narrative

Kagame's government has carefully crafted his image as Rwanda's indispensable leader through state-controlled media and education systems:

• The RPF's military victory is presented as the definitive end to ethnic violence, while omitting Kagame's apparent prioritisation of achieving full political power over halting the massacres. Research by Straus (2019) suggests that the RPF rejected potential ceasefire arrangements that might have saved lives but would have required political compromise or power-sharing.
• Constitutional amendments in 2015 effectively eliminated term limits, potentially allowing Kagame to remain in power until 2034 (International Crisis Group, 2021).
• Official commemorations and memorials reinforce the narrative that only Kagame's leadership can prevent a return to ethnic violence, whilst obscuring evidence suggesting the RPF may have made strategic decisions that allowed violence to escalate to justify their eventual seizure of complete power (Straus, 2019).

Research by Waldorf (2017) demonstrates how this narrative functions as a form of "anticipatory repression," where the threat of instability is used to justify authoritarian governance.

3. Controlling Historical Narratives

The Rwandan government maintains strict control over how the genocide is discussed and remembered:

• The RPF's official narrative focuses exclusively on Tutsi victimhood, despite evidence of complex violence that affected all ethnic groups.
• Researchers who document RPF killings of Hutus during and after the genocide risk being accused of "genocide denial" (Ingelaere, 2020).
• Academic Susan Thomson faced deportation after conducting research on rural Rwandans' experiences of post-genocide reconciliation policies that challenged official narratives (Thomson, 2013).
• Any discussion of Kagame's potential culpability in refusing certain forms of UN intervention during the genocide, as alleged by former UN officials, is strictly forbidden in Rwanda (Dallaire, 2004; Prunier, 2009).
• The government prohibits examination of evidence suggesting that Kagame's primary objective was securing total political control rather than stopping the genocide as quickly as possible (Rever, 2018).

Leveraging International Guilt for Diplomatic Advantage

Western inaction during the 1994 genocide has created a profound sense of guilt among international powers. Kagame has expertly exploited this sentiment to secure diplomatic support and financial aid whilst deflecting criticism.

1. Securing Financial Support Without Accountability

Rwanda remains heavily dependent on foreign aid, receiving approximately $1 billion annually (World Bank, 2022). Kagame has positioned Rwanda as a model of post-conflict development:

• The UK government provided £64 million in bilateral aid to Rwanda in 2020/21 despite concerns about human rights abuses.
• The United States has contributed over $3 billion in assistance since the genocide, with limited conditions attached (USAID, 2022).
• Rwanda's economic growth rates of 6-8% annually are frequently cited as evidence of successful governance, despite concerns about inequality and rural poverty (IMF, 2022).

2. Deflecting International Criticism

When faced with criticism regarding human rights abuses or regional interventions, Kagame consistently reminds Western powers of their failure to prevent the genocide:

• Following a 2012 UN report implicating Rwanda in supporting M23 rebels in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Kagame accused the international community of "selective amnesia" regarding their abandonment of Rwanda in 1994.
• When the UK temporarily suspended aid in 2012 due to these allegations, Kagame publicly suggested that Western powers were reverting to colonial attitudes.
• In response to criticisms of his 2017 election victory (with 98.8% of votes), Kagame stated that "Western-style democracy" was inappropriate for Rwanda's post-genocide context (The Economist, 2017).

3. Reshaping Diplomatic Relationships

Kagame has strategically used the genocide narrative to redefine Rwanda's international relationships:

• In 2021, French President Emmanuel Macron acknowledged France's "overwhelming responsibility" in the genocide but stopped short of offering an apology, following a Rwandan government-commissioned report on France's role (Muse Report, 2021).
• Belgium issued a formal apology in 2000 for its failure to prevent the genocide, establishing a foundation for improved relations on Kagame's terms.
• Rwanda's diplomatic pivot towards China and other emerging powers provides leverage against Western criticism, as Kagame can threaten to further reduce Western influence (Kiwuwa, 2022).

Selective Victimhood and Ethnic Reconciliation

Whilst Kagame's government promotes a narrative of post-ethnic national unity, critics argue that this masks a complex reality of continued ethnic tensions and selective justice.

The Unacknowledged Victims

The Rwandan government's commemoration policies focus exclusively on Tutsi victims, despite evidence of widespread violence against Hutus:

• The UN Mapping Report (2010) documented "systematic and widespread attacks" against Hutu refugees in the DRC by the RPF, which "might constitute crimes of genocide" if proven in court.
• Research by Des Forges (1999) and Lemarchand (2018) documents RPF killings of between 25,000-45,000 Hutus during and after the genocide.
• Hutus who lost family members to RPF violence have no public space to mourn or seek justice, as such expressions are criminalised as "genocide denial" or "promoting divisionism" (Jessee, 2017).

Legal and Political Suppression

The Rwandan government's approach to ethnic reconciliation involves suppressing certain historical narratives:

• The government has replaced ethnic identities with a single "Rwandan" identity, making it illegal to identify as Hutu, Tutsi, or Twa in official contexts.
• Critics argue this approach prevents genuine reconciliation by imposing a "forced amnesia" rather than addressing historical grievances (Purdeková, 2015).
• The government's "Ndi Umunyarwanda" (I am Rwandan) programme requires Hutus to apologise collectively for the genocide, regardless of individual actions, reinforcing a narrative of collective Hutu guilt (Chakravarty, 2016).

Military Interventionism and Regional Influence

Kagame has repeatedly used the genocide narrative to justify Rwanda's military interventions in neighbouring countries, particularly the DRC:

• Rwanda has officially or unofficially intervened in the DRC multiple times since 1996, claiming to target genocide perpetrators and protect Tutsis.
• These interventions have contributed to massive humanitarian crises, with over 5.4 million excess deaths in the DRC between 1998 and 2007 (International Rescue Committee, 2008).
• UN reports have repeatedly accused Rwanda of supporting armed groups in eastern DRC, including the M23 rebellion, which has led to widespread displacement and human rights abuses (UN Group of Experts, 2023).
• Rwanda's military interventions have coincided with the extraction of valuable minerals from eastern DRC, leading to accusations of economic exploitation behind the security justifications (Global Witness, 2020).

Conclusion: The Sustainability of Kagame's Strategy

Paul Kagame's strategic use of genocide memory has proven remarkably effective in consolidating power and securing international support. However, this approach faces increasing challenges:

• Growing international awareness of Rwanda's human rights abuses and regional interventionism is eroding the effectiveness of the victimhood narrative.
• A new generation of Rwandans with no direct memory of the genocide may be less receptive to governance justified by historical trauma.
• The contradiction between Rwanda's economic development rhetoric and its authoritarian political system is becoming increasingly apparent to international observers.

While Kagame has created a political system that appears stable on the surface, the suppression of genuine political pluralism and open historical discourse may ultimately undermine Rwanda's long-term stability. The question remains whether Rwanda can transition to a more inclusive political system that acknowledges its complex history without returning to ethnic violence.

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 Prepared by African Rights Alliance, London, UK