Understanding MONUSCO and Rwanda's Criticism in the DRC Conflict

 Introduction

The United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) has been one of the largest and longest-running UN peacekeeping operations in history. Established in 1999 (initially as MONUC before becoming MONUSCO in 2010), the mission has faced numerous challenges in its efforts to bring stability to the war-torn eastern regions of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). As MONUSCO prepares for its phased withdrawal, a complex web of regional politics, competing interests, and security concerns has emerged. At the center of this complexity is Rwanda's President Paul Kagame, whose government has been one of the most vocal critics of the UN mission. This analysis examines the multifaceted nature of Rwanda's criticism of MONUSCO, explores the potential consequences of MONUSCO's withdrawal, and evaluates possible alternatives that could fill the security vacuum in eastern DRC.

Understanding Why President of Rwanda Paul Kagame criticizes MONUSCO

Rwanda has not been a participant in MONUSCO, and that is part of why Kagame has been so critical of it. His criticism is not just about MONUSCO's effectiveness but also about its structure and the way it operates in the region.

Here's a more refined breakdown of why Kagame criticizes MONUSCO:

1. Perceived Ineffectiveness – MONUSCO has been in the DRC for over 20 years, but violence persists. Kagame argues that it has failed to dismantle armed groups, particularly the FDLR, which Rwanda considers a major security threat.
2. Bias and Political Influence – Kagame accuses MONUSCO of siding with the DRC government and ignoring Rwanda's security concerns. He believes it focuses too much on blaming Rwanda for the conflict instead of addressing the root causes of instability in the DRC.
3. Lack of Regional Involvement – Kagame supports African-led security solutions (like the East African Community Regional Force - EACRF) instead of international interventions like MONUSCO, which he sees as ineffective and externally controlled.
4. Rwanda's Exclusion from MONUSCO – Since Rwanda is not part of MONUSCO, it has no influence over its operations. Kagame argues that if Rwanda had a role, it could contribute more effectively to security in the region.
5. Pressure on Rwanda – The DRC and MONUSCO have repeatedly accused Rwanda of backing M23 rebels, something Kagame denies. He sees MONUSCO as part of a broader effort to isolate Rwanda diplomatically.

MONUSCO, through the UN Group of Experts, has played a crucial role in monitoring and reporting human rights abuses in the DRC, including those allegedly committed by Rwandan forces and their M23 rebel allies. Kagame's criticism of MONUSCO is not just about its effectiveness but also about its role in exposing Rwanda's involvement in the DRC conflict.

Why Kagame Wants MONUSCO Gone

1. MONUSCO Reports on Rwandan Abuses – UN experts have documented Rwandan support for M23 and human rights violations committed in eastern Congo. These reports damage Kagame's international image and lead to pressure from Western powers.
2. Accountability & Impunity – MONUSCO helps document war crimes, killings, and abuses committed by all actors in the conflict, including Rwandan-backed groups. If MONUSCO leaves, Kagame would have fewer international observers in the region, reducing scrutiny.
3. Diplomatic Pressure on Rwanda – MONUSCO's reports have led to sanctions and criticism from the US, EU, and other international bodies. By pushing for MONUSCO's withdrawal, Kagame reduces the mechanisms that expose Rwanda's actions.
4. Strengthening M23 & Influence in DRC – Without MONUSCO, Rwanda-backed rebels could operate with less international oversight, allowing Kagame to maintain influence over eastern Congo, a resource-rich area Rwanda has long been accused of exploiting.

What Happens if MONUSCO Leaves?

• Less International Oversight – Human rights abuses by all actors (M23, Congolese army, local militias) may increase without independent monitoring.
• More Power for M23 – Without UN forces, M23 could expand its territory, further destabilizing eastern DRC.
• Weakened Civilian Protection – Many communities rely on MONUSCO for protection. Its departure could leave civilians at greater risk of violence.

Kagame's criticism of MONUSCO is not just about inefficiency but also about removing a watchdog that exposes Rwanda's military and economic activities in the DRC. His government denies these allegations, but UN reports and Western sanctions suggest otherwise.

MONUSCO's effectiveness is determined by the UN Security Council, not by Kagame's personal opinions. His criticism is self-serving because Rwanda is not part of MONUSCO, and he tends to attack institutions and initiatives where he has no influence.

Why Kagame's Criticism is Politically Motivated

1. Selective Criticism – Kagame only criticizes international missions he is not part of. If Rwanda were included, he would likely support MONUSCO or try to shape its agenda.
2. Lack of Authority Over MONUSCO – MONUSCO operates under a UN Security Council mandate, not Rwanda's control. Kagame's attacks are political rather than constructive because Rwanda has no direct say in MONUSCO's operations.
3. A Convenient Scapegoat – By blaming MONUSCO for instability, Kagame shifts focus away from Rwanda's own role in the conflict, particularly its support for M23 rebels, as repeatedly documented by UN experts.
4. Ignoring the Bigger Picture – While MONUSCO has weaknesses, it has also provided humanitarian aid, security for civilians, and human rights monitoring. Kagame ignores these contributions because they don't serve his political interests.
5. The Security Council Decides – Whether MONUSCO stays or leaves is up to the UN Security Council, based on an evaluation of its impact, not Kagame's complaints. His criticism is not a decisive factor.

The Reality: Why MONUSCO Is Leaving

The decision to withdraw MONUSCO is not because of Kagame but because:

• The Congolese government itself requested it, saying MONUSCO failed to restore peace.
• Public protests in the DRC demanded MONUSCO's departure.
• UN strategy aims to shift responsibility to the Congolese army and regional forces.

Kagame benefits from MONUSCO's exit, but the decision was not his to make. The real question now is who will fill the security gap when MONUSCO leaves.

MONUSCO operates under the mandate given by the UN Security Council, and its effectiveness depends on the powers and limitations set by that mandate. Kagame's criticism ignores this reality because MONUSCO can only act within the rules defined by the Security Council.

Understanding MONUSCO's Mandate

1. Protection of Civilians – MONUSCO's primary role is to protect civilians from armed groups, including M23, FDLR, and other militias.
2. Support to the Congolese Army (FARDC) – MONUSCO provides training, intelligence, and logistical support but does not operate independently unless authorized.
3. Human Rights Monitoring – MONUSCO investigates and reports war crimes, human rights abuses, and violations, including those committed by government forces and foreign-backed militias.
4. Disarmament and Reintegration – MONUSCO helps disarm and reintegrate former combatants into civilian life.
5. Limited Offensive Operations – The Intervention Brigade (FIB), created in 2013, was given a stronger mandate to neutralize armed groups, but political constraints have limited its full effectiveness.

Why MONUSCO Faces Challenges

• Political Limitations – The Security Council decides how much power MONUSCO has, and it is often restricted by diplomatic concerns.
• Dependence on Congolese Government – MONUSCO cannot act without cooperation from the DRC government, which sometimes limits its ability to confront certain militias.
• Kagame's Criticism is Misleading – Instead of acknowledging that MONUSCO follows Security Council directives, Kagame falsely portrays it as a failed mission.

The Key Question: What Happens After MONUSCO Leaves?

• If the Security Council does not replace MONUSCO with another mission, who will ensure civilian protection and monitor human rights?
• Can the Congolese Army (FARDC) handle security alone, given its past failures?
• Will regional forces like the East African Community (EAC) or SADC step in?

What alternatives could replace MONUSCO's role in the DRC?

With MONUSCO's withdrawal from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), several possible alternatives could step in to replace its role in security, human rights monitoring, and peacekeeping. However, each alternative has its own strengths and limitations.

1. Strengthening the Congolese Army (FARDC)

How it Could Work:

• The Congolese government wants to take full control of its security after MONUSCO leaves.
• The FARDC (Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo) would need better training, resources, and reforms to effectively manage security.

Challenges:

• The FARDC has been weak, poorly trained, and accused of human rights abuses.
• Corruption and lack of discipline make it difficult for FARDC to secure the region alone.
• Some FARDC units have collaborated with militias, making trust in them an issue.

2. East African Community Regional Force (EACRF)

How it Could Work:

• The East African Community (EAC) deployed a regional force in 2022, including troops from Kenya, Uganda, Burundi, and South Sudan.
• This force was meant to help stabilize eastern DRC and mediate between rebels and the government.

Challenges:

• The DRC rejected the EACRF in 2023, saying it failed to fight the M23 rebels effectively.
• Regional rivalries (especially between Rwanda and DRC) limit cooperation.
• Some EAC countries (like Uganda) have their own interests in eastern DRC's resources.

3. Southern African Development Community (SADC) Military Deployment

How it Could Work:

• The SADC (Southern African Development Community) announced a new military mission in DRC after the EAC force was removed.
• Countries like South Africa, Tanzania, Angola, and Malawi are expected to contribute troops.

Challenges:

• SADC has limited experience in fighting rebel groups in the DRC.
• Military deployment is expensive, and success depends on funding and logistics.
• Coordination with FARDC could be difficult.
• The SADC has initiated a phased withdrawal of its troops from the DRC, as reported by Reuters on March 13, 2025.

4. African Union (AU) Peacekeeping Mission

How it Could Work:

• The African Union (AU) could create a new peacekeeping mission, similar to what it did in Somalia (AMISOM).
• AU forces could receive international funding and operate under a new security mandate.

Challenges:

• The AU has limited resources and depends on UN or Western funding.
• African countries may not be willing to send troops for a long-term mission.
• Political divisions within the AU could slow decision-making.

5. A Smaller, More Focused UN Mission

How it Could Work:

• Instead of MONUSCO, the UN could deploy a smaller, specialized mission focused on:
• Human rights monitoring
• Political mediation
• Training FARDC forces
• Supporting local security reforms

Challenges:

• A smaller mission may lack enforcement power to protect civilians.
• It would need strong support from the Congolese government to operate effectively.
• Funding may be less than MONUSCO's, limiting impact.

6. Greater International Involvement (EU, US, France)

How it Could Work:

• Western countries could provide direct military aid, training, and logistical support to the DRC.
• The EU and US have already imposed sanctions on Rwanda for its role in the conflict.
• France, Belgium, and the US could help with intelligence and counterterrorism operations.

Challenges:

• Foreign military involvement could be seen as neo-colonialism.
• Western countries may not want to get deeply involved in a complex African conflict.
• The DRC may prefer African-led solutions rather than Western intervention.

7. Strengthening Local Peace Initiatives

How it Could Work:

• Investing in local mediation programs between communities, militias, and government forces.
• Strengthening local security forces (like community-based defense groups).
• Supporting economic development to reduce militia recruitment.

Challenges:

• Many armed groups survive by exploiting mineral resources (gold, coltan, etc.), making peace difficult.
• The DRC's government lacks funding and organization to implement local security reforms.
• Armed groups like M23 prefer military control over negotiations.

Which Alternative is Best?

There is no perfect solution, but the most likely replacement for MONUSCO's role will be a combination of: ✔ Strengthening the FARDC (but this takes time and reforms). ✔ SADC military mission (if it gets enough funding and cooperation). ✔ A smaller UN or AU mission (to monitor human rights and mediate conflicts). ✔ Stronger regional cooperation (but political tensions between Rwanda, Uganda, and the DRC are a big obstacle).

Without proper security measures, MONUSCO's exit could lead to more violence, humanitarian crises, and regional instability.

Conclusion

The impending withdrawal of MONUSCO from the Democratic Republic of Congo marks a critical juncture in the region's complex security landscape. While President Kagame's criticism of the mission appears to focus on its effectiveness, a deeper analysis reveals more self-interested motivations related to reducing international scrutiny of Rwanda's activities in eastern DRC. As MONUSCO prepares to exit, the international community faces significant challenges in ensuring that the security vacuum doesn't lead to increased violence and humanitarian suffering.

The success of any post-MONUSCO security arrangement will depend on several factors: the DRC government's commitment to military and governance reforms; the willingness of regional actors to prioritize stability over competition for resources; international support for capacity building; and addressing the underlying economic and political grievances that fuel conflict. A multi-layered approach combining strengthened national security forces, regional cooperation, and international oversight offers the best chance for sustainable peace.

Without MONUSCO's watchful eye, there is a real risk that human rights abuses could increase and armed groups, particularly those with external backing like the M23, could expand their control. The international community must remain engaged and hold all actors accountable, including Rwanda, to prevent eastern DRC from descending into greater chaos. The stakes are high not just for the millions of civilians caught in the conflict zone but for the stability of the entire Great Lakes region.

References

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