For nearly three decades, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has remained at the epicenter of regional instability where economic interests, security issues, and power rivalries intertwine. Recurrent conflicts in the eastern part of the country — particularly in the provinces of North Kivu, South Kivu, Ituri, and Maniema — reveal not only the structural fragility of the Congolese state but, more importantly, the systematic instrumentalization of this weakness by foreign and regional powers.
Two recent diplomatic dynamics embody this
reality:
- The
Washington system, which relies on a logic of regional
economic and security integration supposedly beneficial to stability, but
whose real dividends primarily favor Rwanda;
- The
Doha system, which tends to legitimize the M23
rebellion and ratify the fragmentation of Congolese sovereignty for
Kigali's benefit.
In both cases, these peace mechanisms are part
of a façade diplomacy where conflict resolution mechanisms are transformed into
tools of influence and control, rather than instruments of justice and
sovereignty.
1. The
Washington System: An Asymmetric Peace Rewarding the Aggressor
1.1 The
System's Architecture
The "Washington system" refers to
the American policy for managing the Great Lakes crisis, articulated around
three main axes:
- Securing
strategic mining zones for global supply chains (cobalt,
coltan, lithium, copper);
- Regional
stabilization through economic integration,
notably through cooperation between Rwanda and the DRC, including joint
exploitation of certain Congolese resources;
- Privileged
security cooperation with Rwanda, perceived as a stable and reliable
partner.
This approach rests on a utilitarian logic:
regional stability would require the leadership of a strong state, in this case
Rwanda. The agreement signed on June 27, 2025, in Washington between the
DRC and Rwanda, with President Donald Trump's participation, illustrates this
vision: it prioritizes rapid normalization of relations without addressing the
root causes of the conflict.
1.2
Systematic Exploitation of Congolese Weakness
Aware of its inability to protect its
territory and independently exploit its resources, the DRC turned to Washington
to obtain security support in exchange for economic guarantees in the mining
sector. However, this dependence has created a profoundly asymmetric
relationship where Congo appears more as a terrain for geostrategic
experimentation than as a sovereign actor.
Meanwhile, Paul Kagame skillfully
instrumentalizes this dynamic: he positions himself as an indispensable actor
for regional peace, even as his forces and allies — notably the M23 — actively
destabilize the DRC. This strategy allows Rwanda to:
- Benefit
from diplomatic capital with Western powers;
- Obtain
bilateral investments and aid in the name of regional stability;
- Maintain
privileged access to Congolese minerals through structured smuggling
networks.
According to the US Geological Survey, Rwanda's
coltan exports increased by 50% between 2022 and 2023, despite the country
lacking sufficient reserves to justify such volumes. These minerals actually
come from M23-controlled zones in the DRC, notably from Rubaya, one of
the world's largest coltan sources, which fell to M23 in April 2024. Experts
estimate that M23 collects at least $800,000 per month solely from
coltan taxation in Rubaya.
Thus, under the guise of the "Washington
peace framework," Kigali profits from a double discourse: on one side,
that of regional peacemaker; on the other, that of silent aggressor who
economically benefits from the chaos it maintains.
1.3
DRC–Rwanda Agreements: An Illusion of Cooperation
The Washington system, under the cover of
regional integration, transforms into a tool of indirect economic annexation.
The DRC obtains only crumbs — a few promises of investments and logistical
support — without any real restoration of territorial or economic sovereignty.
The Washington agreement of June 2025, although presented as progress, has
produced no concrete changes on the ground.
2. The Doha
System: A Peace of Recognition Institutionalizing Balkanization
2.1 Origin
and Logic of the Doha System
The "Doha system" refers to
negotiations initiated in Qatar in April 2025, where diplomats, Western
representatives, and M23 delegates met to explore a political solution to the
eastern conflict.
Unlike the Washington system (more global and
economic), the Doha system is based on a logic of political recognition:
it aims to integrate M23 into a formal dialogue process, presenting it not as a
terrorist rebel group but as a legitimate negotiating actor.
This approach, defended by Rwanda, posits that
peace cannot be built without M23, presented as representing a
"marginalized" community (Congolese Tutsis). However, this narrative
deliberately obscures Rwanda's direct and documented role in M23's formation,
armament, command, and financing.
2.2 The
January-February 2025 Offensive: A Context of Territorial Conquest
The Doha process opened as M23, with massive
support from the Rwandan Defence Forces (RDF), launched its most significant
offensive since 2012. On January 28, 2025, M23 captured Goma, the
North Kivu capital and city of one million inhabitants, despite the presence of
MONUSCO, SADC forces, and local militias. On February 15, 2025, Bukavu,
the South Kivu capital, fell.
These conquests were made possible by massive
Rwandan support. The UN Group of Experts report, published in July 2025,
confirms the deployment of at least 6,000 Rwandan soldiers on Congolese
territory. This support includes:
- Military
training in camps located in Rwanda;
- Provision
of sophisticated weapons: Turkish Bayraktar TB2 drones, Chinese SHORAD
missile systems, electronic warfare equipment;
- Coordinated
operational command involving senior Rwandan officers identified by the
UN, including James Kabarebe (Minister of Regional Cooperation), General
Vincent Nyakarundi (RDF Chief of Staff), and General Patrick Karuretwa.
This offensive caused nearly 3,000 deaths,
including the provincial military governor, and triggered the displacement of 500,000
additional people, adding to the 2 million already displaced in the
East.
2.3 The
Doha Signature: A Trapped Recognition
Despite this context of military conquest, or
rather because of it, on July 19, 2025, the DRC and M23 signed in Doha a
declaration of principles including a commitment to a "permanent
ceasefire." This declaration provided for:
- Opening
formal negotiations no later than August 8, 2025;
- Signing
a comprehensive peace agreement no later than August 18, 2025;
- A
"roadmap for restoring state authority" in M23-controlled zones.
However, these deadlines were not met.
As of November 2025, no definitive peace agreement has been concluded. Fighting
continues sporadically, M23 maintains its control over Goma, Bukavu, and
strategic mining zones, and poses new conditions before any agreement: release
of hundreds of prisoners, lifting of arrest warrants against its members, and
recognition of its political status.
By participating in these negotiations, the
DRC fell into a legitimization trap. It implicitly recognizes M23 as a
political actor, even though it is responsible for war crimes and is merely a
proxy for the Rwandan army.
2.4
Consequences of This Recognition
This posture dramatically weakens Kinshasa's
position:
- It undermines
the Congolese government's credibility, unable to protect its
population;
- It reinforces
the Rwandan narrative that the conflict is "internal" rather
than foreign aggression;
- It distances
the possibility of international justice against Kigali for its
documented and repeated interference;
- It
creates a dangerous precedent: any armed rebellion supported by a
neighboring state can now demand political recognition in exchange for a
ceasefire.
The Doha system, supposedly aimed at
appeasement, instead ratifies the territorial and moral division of the
country. It institutionalizes M23's presence in conquered zones and prepares a
de facto partition of Congolese territory.
3.
Structural Errors and Strategic Weakness of the DRC
3.1
Misreading the Conflict's Causes
For years, the DRC — under international
pressure — accepted the narrative that the Democratic Forces for the
Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) constituted the main cause of regional
instability.
This vision, promoted by Kigali, allowed
Rwanda to justify its military incursions into Congo as "preventive
operations" against the FDLR, while they often served as cover for
well-documented economic and territorial objectives.
By focusing on this peripheral threat,
Kinshasa neglected the true nature of the Rwandan project: a systematic
expansionist project aimed at transforming Kivu into an economic and
security buffer zone under Kigali's direct influence.
President Félix Tshisekedi, after several
years of trust in regional diplomacy, finally publicly acknowledged that Rwanda
seeks to annex Kivu, not to protect a threatened ethnic minority. But
this awareness comes late, after years of diplomatic concessions.
3.2 Risky
Diplomatic and Security Dependence
Faced with its inability to defend national
territory, the DRC multiplies external partnerships: United States, France,
SADC forces (South Africa, Malawi, Tanzania), Burundi, Uganda. Paradoxically,
this strategic dependence dilutes national sovereignty into a set of
contradictory interests.
Each foreign partner acts according to its own
priorities — economic, military, or diplomatic — rarely aligned with those of
the Congolese people:
- The
United States prioritizes access to strategic minerals;
- France
seeks to maintain its influence in the Great Lakes region;
- SADC
countries pursue their own security agendas;
- Burundi
fears similar destabilization orchestrated by Rwanda.
While the DRC awaits external rescue, its
neighbors build long-term strategies based on its fragility. Rwanda transforms
its small size into a strategic advantage: it acts quickly, speaks with one
voice, and methodically exploits Congolese divisions.
3.3
Internal Governance Incapable of Resistance
Beyond diplomacy, the DRC's main Achilles heel
lies in its deficient internal governance:
- Endemic
corruption at all state levels;
- Fragmented,
under-equipped, and often undisciplined army (FARDC);
- Absence
of effective control over eastern borders;
- Weak
national cohesion and exploitable ethno-regional divisions;
- Inability
to generate sufficient tax revenues despite immense mineral wealth.
This chronic disorganization makes the country
structurally vulnerable to external manipulation. As long as the Congolese
government does not build a clear national vision for security and
development, it will remain prisoner to frameworks imposed by other, more
organized and determined actors.
4. The
Consequences: Toward Silent Balkanization
Both systems — Washington and Doha — converge
toward the same disastrous result: the progressive deconstruction of
Congolese sovereignty.
- The Washington
system legitimizes economic and security dependence where Rwanda
becomes the privileged partner of major Western powers, despite its
documented role as aggressor;
- The Doha
system confers political recognition on M23 and prepares a de facto
partition of Congolese territory, institutionalizing rebel control over
strategic zones.
In both cases, Paul Kagame emerges
victorious:
- He
obtains international recognition as an indispensable actor for regional
stability;
- He
consolidates Rwandan military presence in Kivu;
- He
diverts mineral wealth toward Kigali through now quasi-institutionalized
circuits;
- He
imposes his political agenda on Kinshasa despite UN resolutions.
Meanwhile, the DRC remains mired in defensive
and reactive logic, accumulating diplomatic and territorial defeats.
The balkanization of Congo is therefore not a
brutal project of classic military annexation, but a gradual and
sophisticated process of sovereignty erosion, orchestrated through peace
mechanisms diverted from their initial objective. It is conquest through
diplomatic instrumentalization.
5.
International Reactions: Between Condemnations and Impotence
Faced with this situation, the international
community has multiplied declarations and measures without managing to reverse
the dynamic on the ground.
5.1 UN
Resolutions
The UN Security Council unanimously adopted,
in February 2025, a resolution strongly condemning the M23 offensive and
demanding:
- Immediate
cessation of hostilities;
- M23
withdrawal from all controlled zones;
- "Unconditional"
withdrawal of Rwandan Defence Forces from Congolese territory;
- Dismantling
of parallel administrations established by M23.
However, these demands remained a dead
letter. Rwanda continues to deny any direct military involvement, despite
overwhelming evidence from the UN Group of Experts.
5.2
European Union Sanctions
In March 2025, the European Union imposed
targeted sanctions against Rwandan officers and M23 leaders, including:
- RDF
officers: Ruki Karusisi, Eugène Nkubito, Pascal Muhizi;
- M23
leaders: Bertrand Bisimwa, Désiré Rukomera, Jean-Bosco Nzabonimpa Mupenzi;
- Francis
Kamanzi, CEO of Rwanda Mines, Petroleum and Gas Board, for his involvement
in illegal mineral exploitation.
These sanctions, while symbolically important,
have not modified Rwanda's behavior or slowed M23's advance.
5.3
Withdrawal of Angolan Mediation
In March 2025, Angolan President João
Lourenço withdrew from his role as mediator after years of fruitless
efforts within the Luanda process framework. This withdrawal symbolizes the
failure of traditional African mediations in the face of Rwandan determination
and Congolese weakness.
6.
Perspectives and Paths of Resistance
To escape this destructive spiral, the DRC
must radically rethink its strategy at several levels:
6.1 Refocus
Diplomacy on National Sovereignty
The DRC must refuse imposed diplomatic
frameworks without real guarantees of neutrality and respect for
sovereignty. This implies:
- Systematically
demanding prior withdrawal of all foreign forces before any negotiation;
- Prioritizing
alliances based on effective reciprocity, particularly with African actors
sharing an authentic pan-African vision;
- Rejecting
any direct negotiation with M23 until it disarms and accepts its
dissolution;
- Demanding
international recognition of Rwanda as an aggressor state, in accordance
with documented UN reports.
6.2
Rehabilitate Internal Legitimacy and Capacity
Strengthening national institutions
constitutes the absolute priority:
- Urgently
restructure, professionalize, and equip the army (FARDC);
- Reestablish
effective control over eastern borders;
- Combat
systemic corruption that undermines state credibility;
- Restore
public trust in national institutions;
- Develop
genuine national cohesion beyond ethnic and regional divisions.
A restructured, disciplined, well-equipped,
and loyal army is the first condition for lasting peace. Without
credible military capacity, any diplomatic negotiation will be conducted from a
position of weakness.
6.3
Reorient International Discourse
The DRC must systematically denounce the
duplicity of external actors who simultaneously support victims and
aggressors. This requires:
- Offensive
rather than merely defensive diplomacy;
- Systematic
use of international forums (UN, African Union, International Criminal
Court);
- Rigorous
documentation of war crimes and crimes against humanity;
- Mobilization
of international public opinion against Rwandan aggression;
- Demand
for international criminal accountability for implicated Rwandan leaders.
6.4 Exploit
National Resources Sovereignly
The DRC must establish transparent and
equitable partnerships for mining exploitation:
- Renegotiate
leonine contracts that dispossess the country of its wealth;
- Create
strict mineral traceability mechanisms to combat smuggling;
- Develop
local processing industries to capture more added value;
- Diversify
economic partners to reduce unilateral dependencies;
- Massively
invest mining revenues in defense, education, and infrastructure.
6.5 Build a
Regional Resistance Coalition
The DRC cannot confront Rwandan expansionism
alone. It must:
- Strengthen
alliances with similarly threatened countries (notably Burundi);
- Propose
an alternative vision of regional integration based on mutual respect;
- Mobilize
African institutions (African Union, SADC, East African Community);
- Document
and share evidence of Rwandan aggression with all regional actors.
Conclusion:
Confiscated Peace, Sovereignty to be Reclaimed
Analysis of the Washington and Doha systems
reveals a tragic paradox: peace is no longer a sincere objective but a pretext
for geopolitical expansion.
In both approaches, Rwanda methodically
capitalizes on Congolese weakness to extend its territorial, economic, and
political influence, while the DRC, lacking unified strategy and effective
capabilities, contents itself with symbolic diplomatic responses that change
nothing on the ground.
The events of 2025 confirmed this analysis:
- The
January-February 2025 offensive, which resulted in the conquest of Goma
and Bukavu, demonstrates the scale of Rwandan military support to M23;
- The
Washington agreement of June 2025 illustrates American preference for
rapid "stabilization" that does not challenge Rwandan interests;
- The
Doha process, despite signing a declaration of principles in July 2025,
failed to produce a peace agreement and mainly served to legitimize M23 as
a political actor;
- International
sanctions, while symbolically important, have not modified actors'
behavior on the ground.
President Tshisekedi, by finally acknowledging
that Rwanda's objective is the annexation of Kivu, put words to a
reality that UN reports have documented for years. But this awareness, if not
accompanied by radical strategic change, risks arriving too late.
True peace in Congo will come neither from
Washington nor from Doha, but from a reconstruction of Congolese power,
based on:
- Effective
and non-negotiable territorial sovereignty;
- Justice for
crimes committed and responsibilities established;
- Capacity
for resistance — military, economic, and diplomatic —
against external manipulation;
- Internal
legitimacy restored through effective and inclusive
governance;
- A clear
and unified strategic vision of national interest.
As long as the DRC does not impose its own
peace framework, it will remain prisoner to those who claim to save it while
profiting from its weakness. The reconquest of Congolese sovereignty
necessarily passes through refusal of false peace that institutionalizes
dispossession.
The choice is now clear: accept
progressive balkanization disguised as a peace process, or refuse these trapped
frameworks and rebuild, patiently but resolutely, the foundations of a
sovereign state capable of defending its territory and interests.
History will judge severely those who, through
weakness or complacency, will have accepted the silent dismantling of one of
Africa's largest countries.
Prepared by:
Sam Nkumi, Chris Thomson & Gilberte Bienvenue
African Rights Alliance, London, UK
Updated Version: November 2025
Sources and
Additional References
- UN
Group of Experts Reports on the DRC (May-July 2025)
- UN
Security Council Resolution (February 2025)
- Doha
Declaration of Principles (July 19, 2025)
- DRC-Rwanda
Washington Peace Agreement (June 27, 2025)
- European
Union Sanctions (March 2025)
- US
Geological Survey Reports on Rwandan Mineral Exports (2022-2025)
- Analyses
from Crisis Group International, ACLED, and United States Institute of
Peace (2025)
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