Doha Negotiations: Why the DRC Must Refuse the Ceasefire and the Release of Prisoners

The Doha negotiations, presented as a decisive step towards restoring peace in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), once again revolve around two central proposals: a ceasefire between the Congolese Armed Forces (FARDC), the Wazalendo self-defence groups and the March 23 Movement (M23), and the release of prisoners associated with the latter. For international mediators and certain foreign partners, these measures appear reasonable, aimed at reducing the intensity of the fighting and creating a climate conducive to dialogue.

Yet a closer examination of the situation demonstrates that these proposals pose major threats to the sovereignty, security, and stability of the DRC. The country’s recent history, the painful lessons of previous agreements, and the well-established strategies of its adversaries all show that conceding on these points would mean repeating the same mistakes that have allowed Rwanda and its proxy armed groups to sustain destabilising ambitions. Refusing these conditions is not an act of obstinacy, but a strategic imperative for an embattled state.

1. The History of Ceasefires: A Systematic Trap

For more than two decades, successive Congolese governments have signed ceasefire agreements with armed groups active in the East. From the Lusaka Agreement in 1999 to the Sun City talks of 2002, and later the Nairobi accords with the CNDP and M23, each process was framed as a step towards ending violence. Yet in practice, rebel groups have consistently exploited these pauses for military gain.

The pattern is familiar. While the FARDC are ordered to halt operations, the M23 uses the lull to recruit new fighters, reorganise its command structures and receive weapons, training, and logistical support from Rwanda. Ceasefires, far from being moments of de-escalation, have functioned as strategic breathing spaces for rebels.

The results have been disastrous. The FARDC often find themselves demobilised and demoralised, while local populations lose faith in the state’s ability to provide security. From truce to truce, the M23 and its predecessors have entrenched their control over strategic territories, such as the mineral-rich areas of North Kivu.

Accepting another ceasefire in Doha would perpetuate this vicious cycle. Historical precedent is clear: the M23 has never respected a truce. The DRC must therefore break with this repetitive and costly logic.

2. The Strategic Paralysis of the FARDC and Wazalendo

A ceasefire does more than freeze military activity; it also carries psychological and political consequences. By imposing a truce on the FARDC and the Wazalendo, it blunts their vigilance, disrupts their field strategies, and creates the illusion of imminent peace.

The experience of the so-called “Washington Agreements” is telling. At the time, Kinshasa suspended its military efforts in the belief that international powers—particularly the United States—would intervene decisively to resolve the crisis. Instead, this reliance on external salvation paralysed the government, while Congolese civilians endured massacres and displacement.

A truce negotiated in Doha risks recreating this scenario. The FARDC and self-defence groups, who have demonstrated remarkable determination in recent months, would be forced into inaction, leaving the initiative once again to the M23 and its regional backers.

3. Paul Kagame’s Strategy: “To Talk and Fight”

Rwandan President Paul Kagame has long perfected a dual strategy often summarised as “to talk and fight”. It consists of engaging in negotiations while continuing hostilities on the ground. Through this approach, Kagame sustains an international image of a reasonable statesman open to dialogue, even as Rwandan forces, via the M23, wage an undeclared war in Congolese territory.

This duplicity has several advantages for Kigali. It buys time to strengthen rebel positions, diverts international attention, and secures de facto recognition of its influence in the region. Negotiations become not a path to peace, but a theatre for image management.

The DRC can no longer afford to be drawn into this charade. Genuine peace cannot be achieved by indulging Kigali’s duplicity. Refusing both the ceasefire and the prisoner release means rejecting an approach designed to weaken the Congolese state from within.

4. The Prisoner Question: A Threat to National Security

One of the most dangerous conditions under discussion in Doha concerns the release of M23-linked prisoners. Many of these detainees are not mere fighters but trained Rwandan infiltrators arrested inside Congolese territory. Some were apprehended for espionage, targeted assassinations and orchestrating insecurity in both rural and urban areas.

To release them would be to reintroduce highly trained operatives into the conflict, strengthening the M23’s human resources and directly threatening civilian populations. This would also send a devastating message domestically: that the Congolese state capitulates to pressure and cannot protect its citizens.

The stakes are therefore both practical and symbolic. Practically, these prisoners would bolster the M23’s operational capacity. Symbolically, their release would represent betrayal, eroding already fragile public trust in national institutions.

5. An Unequal and Dangerous Negotiation

The Doha talks suffer from a fundamental imbalance. They place a sovereign state, recognised under international law, on the same level as a rebel movement sustained by a foreign power. This false equivalence grants the M23 a legitimacy it does not deserve.

The M23 is not a representative political actor; it is a proxy force, reliant on Rwandan funding, weaponry, and political cover. To recognise it as a legitimate interlocutor is to undermine the very sovereignty of the DRC. It sets a precedent that armed violence, when sufficiently supported from abroad, can elevate a group to the status of political actor.

The DRC must resist this distortion. Negotiating under such terms weakens the authority of the Congolese state and legitimises aggression. Peace must rest not on concessions to rebels, but on respect for sovereignty, non-interference, and the inviolability of borders—principles enshrined in the UN Charter and the Constitutive Act of the African Union.

6. The American Illusion and Inevitable Disappointment

A further danger in the Doha process lies in the ambiguous role of the United States. Washington presents itself as a neutral arbiter, yet its stance has been consistently “balanced” between the aggressor (Rwanda) and the victim (DRC).

On paper, the US supports UN Security Council resolutions condemning the presence of Rwandan Defence Forces on Congolese soil. In practice, however, it avoids applying genuine pressure on Kigali, seeking instead to protect economic and security partnerships.

This ambiguity is not new. Since the 1990s, the US has been instrumental in Rwanda’s military rise, providing political and financial backing. Expecting Washington to impose a firm solution is therefore an illusion that history has repeatedly disproved.

The DRC must draw the correct conclusion: that its security cannot rest on the goodwill of external powers. It must prioritise its own military capacity, while building robust alliances with African institutions such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the African Union.

7. What Alternatives for the DRC?

Rejecting the Doha conditions does not mean abandoning all political solutions. Instead, it means establishing realistic, sovereignty-preserving pathways to peace. Several alternatives are clear:

1. Strengthening national defence: The FARDC and Wazalendo must be reinforced through improved training, logistical support, and morale-building measures. A credible deterrent is essential.
2. Offensive diplomacy: Kinshasa must mobilise the African Union, the SADC, and the UN to pursue targeted sanctions against Rwanda and ensure the conflict is framed internationally as an act of cross-border aggression, not internal unrest.
3. Justice and accountability: Prisoners must be tried for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and espionage, whether in Congolese courts or before international jurisdictions. Their release without due process would undermine justice.
4. National communication: The government must actively explain its choices to the population, counter disinformation, and strengthen public trust in the state as the defender of sovereignty.

These measures would align the DRC’s response with international law and regional solidarity, while ensuring that peace efforts are grounded in justice, not concessions to aggressors.

Conclusion

The Doha negotiations are not a genuine opening towards peace but a trap that the DRC must avoid. The ceasefire, presented as a gesture of goodwill, functions only as a tactical instrument for the M23 and Rwanda to regroup and prepare future offensives. The release of prisoners, meanwhile, represents a direct security threat, restoring to the enemy trained operatives whose mission is to destabilise the DRC further.

Rejecting these conditions is not an act of radicalism, but a necessity dictated by historical experience and political realism. The DRC cannot build peace on concessions that empower aggressors. Instead, it must consolidate its military strength, reaffirm its sovereignty, build regional alliances, and pursue a diplomacy that exposes Rwanda’s responsibility in this proxy war.

True peace will not emerge from illusory truces but from the Congolese state’s determination to defend its territory, uphold justice, and assert its right to sovereignty in the face of aggression.

Prepared par :

Sam Nkumi, Chris Thomson & Gilberte  Bienvenue

African Rights Alliance