Introduction
Since 2022, the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has faced a new phase of instability following the resurgence of the March 23 Movement (M23), backed by elements of the Rwandan Defence Forces (RDF). This rebellion, which Kinshasa considers a creation of Rwanda, has seized several strategic localities in North Kivu, triggering a major humanitarian and security crisis. Within this context, the idea of “joint management” of areas occupied by M23 has emerged in some diplomatic and media circles.
Yet for many Congolese, such a proposition is perceived as an unacceptable capitulation of national sovereignty. Joint management would in practice amount to institutionalising Rwanda’s presence on Congolese soil, via its proxy M23. This raises fundamental questions: does legitimising such an arrangement not deny Rwanda’s central role in this war? Would it not also mean turning a blind eye to the crimes committed by the RDF/M23 against civilian populations?
This article examines in depth why joint management of areas occupied by the RDF/M23 would represent a political and moral defeat for the DRC, and why M23 has no legitimacy to claim a role in such governance.
1. M23: A Rebellion Without Real Autonomy
1.1. A resurgence engineered by Kigali
In 2022, M23 presented itself as a Congolese movement claiming to defend security and political inclusion. However, multiple reports from the United Nations, international NGOs, and independent researchers demonstrate that M23 could not have re-emerged without direct Rwandan support.
The UN Group of Experts on the DRC (2022 and 2023) documented the deployment of Rwandan troops alongside M23, the supply of sophisticated weaponry, military intelligence, and logistical assistance. M23 is therefore a military instrument of Rwanda, not an autonomous actor capable of waging a prolonged conflict.
1.2. A political façade without legitimacy
M23’s discourse relies on the argument of the “marginalisation” of Rwandophone communities. Yet in practice, its actions reveal a logic of military occupation and economic plunder. The movement has neither significant popular support in the DRC nor genuine political legitimacy. Without Rwanda’s military umbrella, M23 would quickly be neutralised by the Congolese Armed Forces (FARDC).
Thus, considering joint management of areas occupied by M23 amounts to indirectly granting Rwanda a say over Kivu. In reality, such joint management would not be between Kinshasa and M23, but between Kinshasa and Kigali.
2. Joint Management as a Defeat of Congolese Sovereignty
2.1. De facto recognition of occupation
International law upholds the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity. Any joint management of occupied territories would constitute an admission of Congolese state weakness and implicit recognition of Rwandan occupation.
Such a scenario would recall the dark days of the Lusaka Agreement (1999) and the Sun City Inter-Congolese Dialogue (2002), where armed groups and their foreign backers secured political recognition. Unlike then, however, M23 today has no broad political base in the DRC; it survives solely through Rwanda’s military support.
2.2. A challenge to the Congolese Constitution
Article 2 of the Congolese Constitution states that the DRC is “a unitary, indivisible, and sovereign state”. Accepting joint management would be a blatant violation of this principle. It would legitimise a de facto partition of the country, with strategic areas such as Rutshuru and Bunagana administered by a foreign-backed armed group.
For the Congolese state, this would be a political capitulation comparable to surrender, with a dangerous precedent: other armed groups could in turn demand similar concessions.
3. The Crimes of RDF/M23: A Heavy Legacy
3.1. Documented civilian massacres
Since M23’s offensive began, thousands of civilians have been killed, particularly in Rutshuru and Masisi territories. Massacres such as that in Kishishe in November 2022, where more than 130 civilians were summarily executed according to the UN, illustrate the brutality of the movement and its allies.
These war crimes and crimes against humanity cannot simply be erased by a political arrangement. Granting joint management to M23 would be tantamount to rewarding war criminals and denying victims their right to justice.
3.2. Mass displacement and sexual violence
Over one million people have been displaced by the M23/RDF offensive, according to UNHCR. Sexual violence, systematically used as a weapon of war in eastern DRC, has also marked this conflict. Numerous harrowing testimonies detail gang rapes and inhumane treatment inflicted on civilians.
Joint management would only institutionalise impunity and ignore these crimes. For victims, it would mean their suffering had been in vain.
4. The Geopolitical Stakes Behind Joint Management
4.1. Kivu’s natural resources
North Kivu is rich in coltan, gold, tin, and tungsten – strategic minerals for global industry. For decades, cross-border networks linked to Rwanda have exploited instability to plunder these resources.
Joint management would lend legal cover to this illegal exploitation, allowing Rwanda to continue extracting under the guise of M23. This would transform clandestine plunder into an official partnership, undermining the Congolese economy and harming local communities.
4.2. Regional and international diplomatic calculations
Some international actors might be tempted to back joint management as a “pragmatic solution” for temporary stabilisation. Yet such a short-term view ignores the root causes of the conflict: Rwandan interference and illegal economic exploitation.
Joint management would not advance peace but constitute a diplomatic trap, strengthening Kigali while weakening Kinshasa in the long run.
5. Why M23 Does Not Deserve Joint Management
5.1. A criminal organisation, not a political actor
M23 is an armed organisation responsible for grave crimes. Under international law, perpetrators of war crimes and crimes against humanity cannot be legitimised as political stakeholders. Unlike other rebel movements that gained a place at negotiating tables (such as the SPLM in Sudan), M23 has no credible political project beyond Rwanda’s agenda.
5.2. Rwanda’s responsibility
Granting joint management to M23 would effectively grant Rwanda a role in administering Kivu. This would bolster the influence of a state accused of armed aggression and interference in Congolese internal affairs. The message would be clear: violence and war crimes pay, opening the door to political gains through force.
6. Joint Management: An Illusion of Peace
Advocates of joint management present it as a pragmatic compromise to “stabilise” occupied zones. This perspective is deeply flawed, as it overlooks the complex dynamics in eastern DRC. Joint management would neither end violence nor curb Rwanda’s ambitions.
6.1. Other militias would not disarm
M23 is not the only armed actor in the east. Groups such as the Wazalendo – spontaneous community self-defence movements – have vowed to fight occupation until total liberation. Meanwhile, Rwanda has itself helped create or support militias like Twirwaneho in South Kivu, designed to divide and weaken Congolese resistance.
Believing joint management would trigger general demobilisation is an illusion. On the contrary, it would generate new tensions, with local communities perceiving it as betrayal. Wazalendo, refusing M23’s legitimisation, would continue their attacks, perpetuating the cycle of violence.
6.2. Resource plunder would continue
Joint management would not end plunder. For three decades, Rwanda has clandestinely exploited minerals in North and South Kivu through well-structured networks. Even under an agreement, Kigali would continue extracting coltan, gold, tin, and tungsten, whether directly via M23 or through other proxy militias.
Thus, joint management would become a legal façade for ongoing plunder, reinforcing Rwanda’s economic control over Kivu rather than halting it.
6.3. The ambition of an “independent state” in Kivu
Finally, Rwanda’s long-term ambition must not be underestimated: to establish permanent influence in Kivu, or even foster the emergence of an “independent state” controlled from Kigali. Some Rwandan political and military elites have expressed such expansionist visions, rooted in the Congo wars of 1996–2003.
Joint management would be a first step towards balkanisation, accustoming the international community to Kinshasa’s lack of control over its territory. Ultimately, Rwanda could exploit this breach to justify formal territorial redrawing.
7. Alternatives to Joint Management: Options for the DRC
7.1. Military reconquest and regional cooperation
The DRC’s primary option remains the military reconquest of occupied territories, supported by regional allies (SADC, Burundi, Tanzania, South Africa). The deployment of the SADC regional force in 2024 demonstrated a willingness to confront M23/RDF militarily. Gradual territorial recovery would reinforce Congolese state sovereignty.
7.2. Diplomacy and international justice
The DRC must also pursue a diplomatic strategy aimed at isolating Rwanda internationally, presenting irrefutable evidence of its involvement. Recourse to international judicial mechanisms (the International Criminal Court, universal jurisdiction courts) could also help establish accountability.
7.3. Reconstruction and state presence
Beyond military and diplomatic responses, the DRC must strengthen state presence in liberated zones: infrastructure, social services, justice, and employment. Only by rebuilding a strong social contract with local populations can the state undermine the appeal and influence of armed groups.
Conclusion: Joint Management, a Trap to Avoid
Joint management of areas occupied by RDF/M23 would not be a compromise, but a historic capitulation for the DRC. It would institutionalise Rwanda’s presence in Kivu, erase M23’s crimes, and severely undermine Congolese sovereignty.
M23 has no legitimacy to claim such joint management: without Rwanda, it could never have occupied these territories. Joint management would thus be nothing more than an agreement between the DRC and Rwanda – an unacceptable scenario for the country’s future.
Instead of falling into this trap, the DRC must pursue a strategy rooted in military resistance, diplomatic mobilisation, and internal reconstruction. Lasting peace in the east will not come from compromises imposed by armed force and foreign interference, but from restoring Congolese sovereignty and delivering justice for victims.
To avoid the capitulation outlined above, it is imperative for the DRC, its regional partners, and the international community to act in concert to transform the prescriptions of UN Security Council Resolution 2773 into reality on the ground. Only by implementing its key measures — withdrawal of foreign forces, restoration of constitutional order, justice for victims, and sustainable reconstruction — can the DRC reclaim sovereignty, secure the east of the country, and turn the page on war.
Prepared by
Sam Nkumi, Chris Thomson & Gilberte Bienvenue
African Rights Alliance
No comments:
Post a Comment