Since the end of the 1994 genocide, Rwanda has cultivated an international image as a reconciled nation that has transcended ethnic divisions. However, this study demonstrates that Paul Kagame's regime maintains a strategic double discourse: while officially denying any ethnic reference within its borders, it systematically instrumentalizes these same identities among its neighbors—particularly in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Burundi—to serve geopolitical, economic, and security objectives.

This instrumentalization takes multiple forms: military and financial support for rebel groups (notably the M23 in the DRC), manipulation of the 'protection of Tutsis' discourse to justify armed interventions, deliberate destabilization of Burundian and Congolese governments, and illegal exploitation of mineral resources in eastern Congo. The paradox is striking: a regime that claims to have abolished ethnicity uses precisely this concept as an instrument of foreign policy.

This analysis examines the mechanisms of this dual strategy, its disastrous humanitarian consequences (more than six million deaths since 1996), and the international complicity that allows its perpetuation. It demonstrates that Congolese Tutsi communities, far from being protected, have become the involuntary hostages of a regional agenda that instrumentalizes them while marginalizing them.

Introduction

The 1994 Rwandan genocide stands as one of the most significant tragedies of the late 20th century. Within one hundred days, between 800,000 and one million Tutsis and moderate Hutus were systematically massacred. This humanitarian catastrophe not only tore apart Rwanda's social fabric but also redefined the geopolitical dynamics of the entire Great Lakes region of Africa for decades to come.

In the years that followed, Rwanda, under the leadership of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) and its leader Paul Kagame, has endeavored to present the world with the image of a model state: a reconciled nation, free from ethnic references, and focused on economic and technological development. This narrative, widely disseminated by international media and supported by numerous Western donors, has helped legitimize an authoritarian political regime in the name of stability and preventing another genocide.

Yet, behind this carefully constructed facade of national unity, the Rwandan regime has continuously resorted to manipulating ethnic identities in the Great Lakes region—particularly in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Burundi—as an instrument of political control, geostrategic expansion, and economic exploitation. This instrumentalization, nourished by the tragic experience of the genocide and the moral legitimacy it confers, aims to extend Rwanda's regional influence under the pretext of protecting Tutsi populations abroad, while structurally weakening its neighbors.

In Burundi, this strategy seeks to weaken the government in power and prevent the emergence of an alternative model of democratic ethnic coexistence. In the DRC, it serves to justify repeated military interventions, notably through the M23 rebel movement, presented as a defender of Congolese Tutsis but actually serving as an instrument of territorial control and access to strategic natural resources. Congolese Tutsis are neither subjects of the Rwandan regime nor Rwandan citizens: their existence and suffering have been manipulated to serve a regional political agenda of which they are, paradoxically, the primary victims.

I. The Rwandan Regime's Double Discourse on Ethnicity

1.1. Official Denial of Ethnicity in Rwanda

One of the ideological pillars of Kagame's regime rests on the absolute rejection of ethnicity as a legitimate political category. After 1994, Rwanda undertook a radical transformation of its national discourse: prohibition of any reference to ethnic affiliations in public space, removal of ethnic mentions from official documents (identity cards, censuses, administrative forms), and active promotion of the vision of a 'new Rwandan,' united beyond the divisions of the past.

This approach was codified in several legislative texts, notably the 2003 Constitution and laws on 'divisionism' and 'genocide ideology.' These texts criminalize any discourse perceived as likely to revive ethnic divisions, with sentences of up to 25 years in prison. In practice, these laws often serve to suppress any political opposition, critical journalism, or social analysis that dares to mention persistent power imbalances between Hutus and Tutsis.

This 'non-ethnicity' policy has seduced international donors, particularly the United States, the United Kingdom, and international financial institutions, who have seen it as an exemplary model of post-conflict reconciliation and good governance in Africa. The 'Rwandan miracle' has become a widely accepted narrative in Western capitals, where Kagame is regularly invited as a speaker and presented as a visionary of African development.

1.2. Instrumentalization of Ethnicities Among Neighbors

However, this discourse of internal unity contrasts radically with a regional policy marked by the systematic manipulation of ethnic identities among Rwanda's neighbors. The Kigali government deliberately exploits ethnic tensions in Burundi and the DRC to justify its self-proclaimed role as guarantor of Tutsi security in the region, creating a strategic asymmetry that confers considerable geopolitical advantage.

The regime asserts that there are no more ethnicities in Rwanda, yet recognizes, invokes, and actively instrumentalizes those existing among neighbors: Hutu, Tutsi, Banyamulenge in Congo, Burundian Hutus and Tutsis, as well as other Congolese ethnic groups (Nande, Hunde, etc.). This contradiction reveals that Rwanda's de-ethnicization is not an accomplished social reality but rather a sophisticated propaganda tool.

This double discourse serves several strategic objectives: internally, it masks the grip of a predominantly Tutsi political and military elite on the state apparatus and allows the suppression of any contestation under the accusation of 'divisionism.' Externally, it legitimizes Rwandan interventionism in the name of protecting 'threatened Tutsis' elsewhere, creating a permanent pretext for interference in neighboring countries' affairs.

1.3. Making Internal Structural Inequalities Invisible

The prohibition of any ethnic reference in Rwanda also serves to conceal the profound social and political inequalities that persist between Hutus and Tutsis. Under the RPF regime, the denial of ethnic identities has established a form of political taboo: anyone who mentions discrimination or ethnic imbalances is immediately accused of 'divisionism' or 'genocidal propaganda,' accusations that can lead to imprisonment, exile, or worse.

Yet, in daily Rwandan reality, ethnic affiliation continues to determine, tacitly but visibly to attentive observers, access to resources, strategic positions, and economic opportunities. Hutus, who represent approximately 85% of the Rwandan population, remain largely marginalized in spheres of power. They rarely occupy strategic positions in the army (particularly in elite units and high command), senior administration, intelligence services, major public or private enterprises, or diplomatic institutions.

Conversely, the majority of key positions—in military command, sovereign ministries (defense, internal security, foreign affairs), intelligence services, diplomacy, and strategic state-owned companies—are held by members from the Tutsi ruling core of the RPF, often former fighters of the rebellion that ended the genocide or their associates.

This economic, military, and administrative domination reflects a social reality that official discourse seeks to erase. The prohibition on naming ethnicities does not eliminate identities; it simply prevents open debate about them, creating 'strategic invisibility' that makes inequalities harder to challenge. Everyone knows, in villages, schools, barracks, and offices, 'who is Hutu' and 'who is Tutsi.' This implicit knowledge guides social relations, marriage strategies, recruitment, promotions, and access to public services, often to the systematic detriment of Hutus.

II. Instrumentalization of Ethnic Divisions in the Democratic Republic of Congo

2.1. Historical Context: The Roots of Manipulation

The presence of Tutsi communities in the DRC, notably the Banyamulenge of South Kivu and the Banyarwanda of North Kivu, dates back to several complex migratory waves, some predating Belgian colonization. These populations, settled for several generations on Congolese territory, have nevertheless often been perceived as 'foreign' or 'not authentically Congolese' by other local communities. This perception has fueled recurring tensions over fundamental issues: Congolese citizenship, access to land (particularly in the fertile highlands of Kivu), and political representation at local and national levels.

Beginning in 1996, two years after the Rwandan genocide, the Kigali regime began systematically exploiting these pre-existing tensions to justify its first major military intervention in eastern Congo (then Zaire under Mobutu). Officially, Rwanda claimed to be pursuing Hutu genocidaires—members of the former Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR) and Interahamwe militias—who had massively taken refuge in refugee camps in eastern Zaire after their defeat in July 1994.

In reality, this first Congo war (1996-1997) pursued much broader objectives: controlling the immense mineral resources of Kivu (gold, coltan, cassiterite, diamonds), installing a friendly regime in Kinshasa (Laurent-Désiré Kabila was thus brought to power by Rwandan and Ugandan forces), and creating a lasting zone of influence in eastern Congo. The discourse of 'protecting Congolese Tutsis' was thus used from the start to camouflage an enterprise of military aggression and de facto economic occupation.

2.2. Successive Rebellions: A Recurring Pattern

Since 1996, the same strategic pattern has repeated with remarkable consistency through several successive rebel movements, all presenting similar characteristics despite different names: the Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD) during the second Congo war (1998-2003), the National Congress for the Defense of the People (CNDP) led by Laurent Nkunda (2006-2009), and more recently the March 23 Movement (M23, since 2012).

Each time, the official demands of these movements are virtually identical: security and recognition of Congolese Tutsi rights, the fight against Rwandan Hutu armed groups (FDLR), and implementation of peace agreements signed with the Congolese government. Each time as well, reports by UN expert groups, investigations by human rights organizations, and analyses by independent observers have demonstrated Rwanda's direct and massive involvement in financing, arming, commanding, and providing logistics for these rebellions.

Meanwhile, on the ground, forces supported by Rwanda systematically control the richest mining areas (Mongbwalu gold mines, Rubaya coltan deposits, cassiterite operations), install parallel administrations that collect taxes and duties, and organize illegal export of minerals to Rwanda where they are 'laundered' and re-exported to international markets, thus fueling the Rwandan economy while impoverishing the DRC.

2.3. M23: Case Study of a Geopolitical Instrument

The March 23 Movement (M23) represents the most recent and best-documented illustration of this instrumentalization strategy. Officially created on March 23, 2012 (hence its name), it presents itself as a movement of Congolese Tutsis demanding full implementation of the March 23, 2009 agreement signed between the Congolese government and the CNDP, which notably provided for integration of CNDP fighters into the Congolese army and security reforms in the east.

However, multiple reports by UN experts mandated by the Security Council (notably those from 2012, 2013, 2022, and 2023) have irrefutably demonstrated Rwanda's direct involvement in M23. These reports detail: forced recruitment of young Rwandans and Congolese refugees in Rwanda, deployment of Rwandan Defense Forces (RDF) officers as M23 commanders, provision of heavy weapons (mortars, rocket launchers, ammunition), logistical support (radio communications, resupply), and even the presence of entire Rwandan army battalions fighting alongside M23 on Congolese territory.

Kigali invariably justifies this involvement by the need to protect 'Congolese Tutsis' against alleged genocide threats orchestrated by the Congolese government or the FDLR. This rhetoric, which constantly references the collective trauma of 1994, allows Rwanda to position itself as a morally legitimate and even necessary actor, even as it directly fuels the war and multiplies violations of international law.

M23 is therefore not an autonomous movement defending an oppressed minority, as Rwandan propaganda claims. It is a military and political instrument of the Rwandan regime to maintain a strategic zone of influence in North Kivu, structurally weaken the Congolese state, and guarantee privileged and lasting access to strategic natural resources: coltan (essential for the electronics industry), gold, cassiterite (tin ore), wolframite (tungsten), and fertile land. The ultimate objective appears to be either the creation of a separate state under Kigali's indirect control (a 'Tutsiland' in eastern Congo), or the lasting transformation of Kivu into a buffer zone dominated by Rwanda, guaranteeing both strategic security depth and continuous economic rent.

2.4. The Banyamulenge Case: From Protection Discourse to Disguised Aggression

One of the most recurrent and effective arguments used by the Rwandan regime to justify its repeated interventions in the DRC is the alleged systematic marginalization or persecution of the Banyamulenge, a Tutsi community settled mainly in the highlands of South Kivu, particularly in Minembwe and surrounding territories.

Kigali systematically presents the Banyamulenge as permanent victims of exclusion, xenophobia, and ethnic attacks, thus justifying its self-proclaimed role as external protector. This narrative deliberately ignores the complex and nuanced reality of Congolese social fabric. The DRC is a country of exceptional diversity, officially counting more than 450 recognized ethnic groups, with their respective languages, customs, and territories. The Banyamulenge are an integral part of this Congolese mosaic.

Their presence on Congolese territory, though sometimes contested in certain local political discourses, is not debated among serious scholars and historians specializing in the region. The Banyamulenge have been settled for several generations (some families since the 18th century), speak Kinyamulenge (a variant of Kinyarwanda adapted to the local context), and fully share Congolese nationality in accordance with laws in force. Their integration into Congolese society, though complex and sometimes locally contested for land (access to pastures), political (local representation), or identity reasons, does not fundamentally differ from intercommunity tensions found elsewhere in a country as vast, diverse, and politically fragmented as the DRC.

In reality, it is precisely the discourse of systematic victimization of the Banyamulenge, maintained and amplified by Kigali, that has contributed to considerably exacerbating intercommunity tensions. By presenting itself as their exclusive and indispensable protector, Rwanda has transformed a complex but manageable social, land, and citizenship question into an explosive geopolitical instrument. Each time the DRC attempts to reassert its sovereignty over its eastern provinces, Kigali mechanically invokes the need to 'protect' Congolese Tutsis against alleged genocidal threats, creating a vicious circle of intervention and violence.

2.5. Congolese Tutsi Refugees: Victims, Not Accomplices

Contrary to the official discourse propagated by Kigali and often uncritically repeated by some international media, the majority of Congolese Tutsi refugees in Rwanda are not willing agents of the Rwandan regime but direct victims of successive violence that this same regime has largely contributed to triggering and perpetuating.

Since 1996, each war directly or indirectly supported by Kigali has caused massive population displacements in eastern Congo. Tens of thousands of Congolese Tutsis, particularly from South Kivu (Banyamulenge) and North Kivu (Banyarwanda), have fled combat, intercommunity reprisals, and generalized insecurity. Some were actively encouraged or even forced by Rwandan authorities to leave their ancestral lands for 'their safety,' in a logic combining genuine humanitarian concerns with cynical strategic calculations.

Once in Rwanda, these refugees found themselves in a situation of profound and painful ambiguity: systematically used in official propaganda as moral justification for Rwandan military interventions ('we must protect our persecuted Tutsi brothers in Congo'), but simultaneously marginalized in daily reality, confined in camps where living conditions are precarious, or strongly encouraged—sometimes forced—to join armed rebel movements supposedly meant to 'liberate' their territory of origin.

These refugees are thus trapped in a cynical double discourse: publicly considered as 'brothers' when they serve the regime's geopolitical ambitions, but made invisible or instrumentalized when their real suffering and legitimate aspiration for a peaceful life contradict Kigali's heroic and simplistic narrative. Their tragic situation perfectly illustrates how the Rwandan regime uses Tutsi populations as instruments rather than ends in themselves.

III. The Rwandan Regime's Interference in Burundi

3.1. Burundian Political Context: A Threatening Alternative Model

Burundi shares with Rwanda a common colonial history, similar ethnic composition (Hutu majority of about 85%, Tutsi minority of about 14%, and small Twa community of about 1%), and a shared language (Kirundi, very close to Kinyarwanda). Both countries have also experienced repeated cycles of ethnic violence throughout their post-colonial history, with massive massacres in Burundi in 1972, 1988, and 1993.

However, unlike Rwanda where the RPF imposed an authoritarian model of forced 'non-ethnicity' after 1994, Burundi followed a different trajectory after its long civil war (1993-2005). The country experienced a fragile but real democratic process, based on explicit recognition of ethnic diversity and power-sharing mechanisms. The Arusha Accords of 2000, negotiated under international mediation (notably by Nelson Mandela), established a sophisticated political system aimed at preventing domination of one ethnic group over another.

These accords established a complex institutional balance: ethnic quotas in institutions (60% Hutu / 40% Tutsi in government and parliament, 50/50 in army and police), rotation of key positions, and veto mechanisms for sensitive decisions. This system, though imperfect and often criticized, nevertheless enabled relative stability and peaceful alternation of power for over a decade. Burundi thus became, despite itself, an alternative model to Rwanda: a country where recognition of ethnic identities and democratic mechanisms of power-sharing coexist, challenging the legitimacy of the Rwandan authoritarian model.

3.2. The 2015 Crisis and Rwanda's Destabilizing Role

The Burundian political system experienced its most serious crisis in 2015, when President Pierre Nkurunziza (Hutu, from the CNDD-FDD party) decided to run for a controversial third term, triggering massive protests, a military coup attempt (in May 2015), and violent repression that killed hundreds and caused the exile of tens of thousands of Burundians.

It was in this context of profound crisis that Rwanda intensified its efforts to destabilize Burundi. Detailed reports by the UN Group of Experts on Burundi (2016, 2017) and regional intelligence services documented that Rwanda had hosted, trained, and armed Burundian opponents on its territory. These groups included former soldiers of the Burundian army who participated in the failed coup, young Hutu refugees recruited in camps, and exiled Burundian opposition politicians.

Several training camps were identified in eastern Rwanda, where these fighters received military training before being infiltrated into Burundi to conduct attacks against Burundian security forces and destabilize the Bujumbura regime. Testimonies from deserters and refugees confirmed these activities, describing forced recruitment in some cases and promises of overthrowing the Burundian regime in others.

This interference considerably aggravated the Burundian crisis, transforming what could have remained an internal political crisis into a regional conflict with multiple dimensions. The Burundian government, for its part, has repeatedly accused Rwanda of wanting to weaken it and seeking to install a puppet regime in Bujumbura, accusations that Kigali has systematically denied despite accumulating documentary evidence.

3.3. Kigali's Strategic Objectives in Burundi

Paradoxically, while Rwanda officially claims to have transcended the ethnic question within its borders, it deliberately stokes divisions between Burundian Hutus and Tutsis to weaken Bujumbura's power. This cynical instrumentalization aims at several interconnected geopolitical objectives.

First, to prevent Burundi from becoming a credible alternative model where recognition of ethnic identities and democratic mechanisms of power-sharing can coexist. Such a model would directly threaten the legitimacy of the Rwandan authoritarian system, which justifies its internal repression by the need to prevent any return of ethnic 'divisionism.' If Burundi succeeds in maintaining relative stability while recognizing ethnic identities, it would demonstrate that the Rwandan approach of total denial is neither necessary nor desirable.

Second, to weaken a neighbor whose cooperation links with the DRC are progressively strengthening. The growing security cooperation between Kinshasa and Bujumbura, particularly in fighting M23 and other armed groups in eastern Congo, is perceived by Kigali as a direct geopolitical threat. A solid Kinshasa-Bujumbura axis could effectively counterbalance Rwanda's regional influence and make its military interventions in Kivu more difficult.

Third, to maintain a permanent climate of instability in the Great Lakes region, which allows Rwanda to continue presenting itself on the international stage as the island of stability and development amid chaos, thus justifying continued Western donor support and maintenance of its authoritarian regime in the name of security necessity. By strategically reviving ethnic tensions in Burundi, the Rwandan regime hopes to create a lasting climate of instability that further isolates Burundi from the international community and makes it vulnerable to Kigali's pressures.

IV. A Regional Strategy of Expansion Under the Guise of Security

4.1. Security Doctrine as a Facade for Power Projection

The instrumentalization of ethnic divisions in the DRC and Burundi is not an isolated or accidental phenomenon. It is part of a coherent, long-term regional strategy aimed at maintaining Rwanda as the hegemonic power in the Great Lakes region, despite its small territorial and demographic size (a country of 26,000 km² and approximately 13 million inhabitants facing the DRC with 2.3 million km² and over 100 million inhabitants).

Since the 1990s, Kigali has systematically justified its regional interventions by 'national security' and the need to neutralize genocidal forces who took refuge abroad. However, this security rhetoric increasingly conflates with pure logic of power projection and expansion of influence. What the regime calls 'security' more closely resembles an enterprise of regional domination than a legitimate defensive posture.

This deliberate confusion between defensive security and hegemonic ambition is facilitated by the memory of the genocide, which confers exceptional moral legitimacy on Rwanda on the international stage. Any state that dares criticize Rwandan interventions risks being accused of minimizing the genocide or playing into the hands of genocidal forces, an accusation particularly paralyzing in the Western context marked by guilt over inaction in 1994.

4.2. Multiple Dimensions of the Rwandan Strategy

Chronic instability in eastern Congo and Burundi benefits Rwanda on several interconnected strategic levels, creating a system of perverse incentives where Kigali directly benefits from the chaos it helps maintain.

Economic Dimension

Illegal exploitation of Congolese minerals constitutes a vital resource for the Rwandan economy, representing according to various estimates between 15% and 25% of Rwandan GDP. Rwanda officially exports massive quantities of gold, coltan, cassiterite, and wolframite, while its subsoil contains very little of these resources. This blatant contradiction is explained by systematic pillaging of Kivu mines. Armed groups supported by Kigali (M23, former CNDP elements) control mining areas, organize extraction, tax local operators, and transport minerals to Rwanda where they are 'legalized' before being sold on international markets.

International Political Dimension

Regional chaos paradoxically reinforces Kagame's position as the supposed guarantor of stability in Western eyes, particularly those of the United States and United Kingdom. By presenting himself as the only 'serious' and 'effective' leader in a region perceived as chaotic, Kagame benefits from considerable diplomatic, military, and financial support. Western powers turn a blind eye to human rights violations in Rwanda and its military interventions in neighboring countries, seeing him as a reliable partner in a region otherwise deemed unmanageable.

Internal Security Dimension

The regional security threat, real or amplified, justifies maintaining a sprawling security apparatus that permanently monitors the Rwandan population. Rwandan intelligence services (notably the DMI, Directorate of Military Intelligence) possess extensive powers, operate with little democratic oversight, and use the threat of 'external enemies' to suppress any internal opposition. Political dissidents, critical journalists, and human rights activists are regularly accused of collaboration with the FDLR or other 'negative forces,' justifying their arrest, forced exile, or physical elimination.

The Rwandan regime therefore operates in a systemic logic of control and expansion, not genuine peace. It presents itself as a bulwark against the chaos it actively helps maintain, creating a self-fulfilling prophecy that legitimizes its internal authoritarianism and external interventionism.

V. Human and Political Consequences of Instrumentalization

5.1. Catastrophic Humanitarian Toll

The cynical exploitation of ethnic identities by Kigali has had absolutely catastrophic human consequences, constituting what some scholars do not hesitate to call 'the greatest humanitarian catastrophe since World War II.' In the Democratic Republic of Congo, more than six million people have died since 1996 in conflicts directly or indirectly related to successive Rwandan interventions.

These deaths result not only from direct armed combat but also and especially from indirect consequences of war: preventable diseases (measles, cholera, malaria) in areas deprived of healthcare access, massive malnutrition due to agriculture collapse, sexual violence systematically used as a weapon of war (with hundreds of thousands of women raped), and complete disintegration of social structures in eastern Congo.

Millions more have been displaced, sometimes repeatedly, becoming internally displaced persons (IDPs) in their own country or refugees in neighboring countries. Displacement camps in North Kivu and South Kivu today house more than 2.5 million people living in precarious conditions, without adequate access to drinking water, healthcare, education, or sustainable livelihoods.

Congolese Tutsi communities themselves, supposedly protected by Rwandan interventions, live in permanent and profound insecurity. They are caught in a tragic trap: on one hand, intercommunity hatred stoked by rebellions supported by Rwanda makes them vulnerable to attacks and reprisals; on the other hand, constant manipulation of their identity by the Kigali regime prevents them from being fully accepted as full Congolese citizens. Many Banyamulenge and Banyarwanda simply aspire to live peacefully on their lands, participate in local political life, and contribute to their country's development, but this legitimate aspiration is constantly sabotaged by Rwandan interference.

5.2. Impact on State Structures and Governance

Beyond the direct human cost, ethnic instrumentalization by Rwanda has profoundly weakened state structures and democratic institutions throughout the region. In the DRC, the central state has progressively lost effective control over large portions of its eastern provinces. Public institutions (schools, hospitals, local administrations) no longer function or function in a very degraded manner in areas controlled by armed groups.

Parallel administrations established by successive rebellions supported by Rwanda (RCD, CNDP, M23) have created a dual power system that undermines Kinshasa's authority and makes any coherent development policy impossible. Local populations no longer know which authority to refer to, creating administrative and legal confusion that favors impunity and arbitrariness.

In Burundi, interethnic mistrust remains maintained by disinformation campaigns, armed group infiltrations from Rwanda, and mutual accusations between Bujumbura and Kigali. These permanent tensions weaken the fragile democratic institutions resulting from the Arusha Accords, hinder national reconciliation efforts, and divert precious resources from development investment toward military and security expenditures.

5.3. Destruction of Regional Cooperation

At the regional level, Rwanda's policy of ethnic instrumentalization has profoundly undermined trust between neighboring states and made construction of a genuine Great Lakes Community based on economic cooperation, mutual respect for sovereignty, and regional solidarity practically impossible.

Regional organizations such as the East African Community (EAC) or the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) are paralyzed by permanent tensions between their members, particularly between Rwanda on one side and the DRC and Burundi on the other. Regional mediation initiatives (Nairobi process, SADC summits) regularly stumble over the question of Rwanda's involvement in Congo and Burundi.

This institutionalized mistrust not only hinders resolution of ongoing conflicts but also prevents realization of regional development projects that could benefit all populations: economic integration, transport corridors, common market, joint management of shared natural resources (lakes, forests, watersheds). The Great Lakes region, which could be a space of shared prosperity thanks to its exceptional natural resources and the complementarity of its economies, remains prisoner to a cycle of mistrust, manipulation, and violence fueled by Rwanda's hegemonic ambitions.

VI. Hypocrisy of Official Discourse and International Responsibility

6.1. The Rwandan Regime's Fundamental Contradiction

The Rwandan regime's discourse that there are no more ethnicities in Rwanda is a matter of political strategy rather than sociological reality. This assertion constitutes a sophisticated instrument of power rather than a faithful description of contemporary Rwandan society. In reality, the domination of a military and political elite from the RPF, largely Tutsi in composition, remains blatant to any attentive observer.

The official denial of ethnic identities within the country allows the regime to effectively suppress any political or social opposition, with any criticism immediately accused of ethnic 'divisionism'—a crime punishable by long prison sentences. Simultaneously, outside Rwandan borders, this same Tutsi ethnic identity is selectively and strategically invoked to justify military interference in Congo and Burundi.

This blatant contradiction is rarely denounced with sufficient vigor by the international community, fascinated by the narrative of the 'Rwandan miracle': a country that supposedly went in a few decades from genocide to prosperity, from division to unity, from chaos to development. This seductive narrative masks the reality of an authoritarian regime that uses the memory of the genocide as a shield against any criticism and as a weapon to extend its regional influence.

6.2. Western Powers' Complicity

Western powers, notably the United States, United Kingdom, and to a lesser extent France (since the diplomatic rapprochement of the 2020s), bear considerable responsibility in perpetuating this system of ethnic instrumentalization. Despite damning and repeated reports by UN experts on Rwanda's role in regional conflicts, despite concordant testimonies from human rights organizations, these powers continue to provide diplomatic, military, and financial support to Kagame's regime.

Several factors explain this persistent complacency. First, Western guilt over inaction during the 1994 genocide creates reluctance to criticize Rwanda, for fear of being accused of insensitivity to genocidal trauma. Second, Rwanda is perceived as a reliable strategic partner in a region considered chaotic and unmanageable. The apparent efficiency of the Rwandan regime, its administrative discipline, and its pro-business rhetoric seduce Western decision-makers.

Finally, substantial economic interests are at stake. Western companies, particularly in technology and electronics sectors, indirectly benefit from pillaging of Congolese minerals 'laundered' via Rwanda. Coltan, essential for manufacturing smartphones and computers, massively transits through Kigali before feeding global supply chains, often without questions about its origin being asked with sufficient insistence.

This international complacency directly encourages the Rwandan regime to continue its ethnic manipulations and military interventions, to the detriment of Congolese and Burundian peoples. As long as Kagame benefits from international impunity, he will have no incentive to modify his destructive regional strategy.

6.3. Role of Media and International Public Opinion

International media also bear a share of responsibility in perpetuating this system. Media coverage of Rwanda remains largely dominated by the narrative of 'economic miracle' and 'successful reconciliation,' without sufficient critical examination of the regime's authoritarian methods or its destabilizing role in the region.

Journalists attempting to investigate Rwanda independently face considerable obstacles: visa refusals, harassment, intimidation, and in some cases physical threats. Several investigative journalists who documented Rwanda's role in Congo or human rights violations within the country have been forced into exile or have suffered assassination attempts.

Meanwhile, the Rwandan government invests massively in international public relations, employing prestigious lobbying firms in Washington, London, and Brussels to shape its image. Sophisticated media campaigns present Rwanda as a model of development, technological innovation (the famous 'African Singapore' project), and enlightened leadership, systematically obscuring the regime's dark aspects. This unbalanced information war contributes to maintaining international public opinion in an erroneous perception of Rwandan and regional reality.

Conclusion

The Rwandan regime uses the ethnic question as a double-edged political weapon, deployed with remarkable cynicism: categorically denied within national borders where it is criminalized as 'divisionism,' it is simultaneously systematically exploited externally as an instrument of regional domination and legitimization of military interventions. Strengthened by the tragic experience of the 1994 genocide and the exceptional moral legitimacy it confers on the international stage, Kigali skillfully manipulates collective memory and fear to establish its hegemony in the Great Lakes region.

In the Democratic Republic of Congo, this strategy concretely translates into the creation, financing, and command of successive rebel movements like M23, publicly presented as legitimate defenders of Congolese Tutsi rights but actually serving as instruments for military interference, de facto territorial appropriation, and illegal exploitation of Kivu's mineral wealth. In Burundi, it aims to deliberately weaken a regime perceived as an ideological competitor, prevent the emergence of an alternative model of democratic ethnic coexistence, and isolate Bujumbura from its regional partners, particularly Kinshasa.

Congolese Tutsis, held hostage by this cynical policy, constitute the primary victims of this double game. Contrary to Kigali's heroic discourse claiming to protect them, many have fled wars caused or maintained by Rwanda itself, only to be instrumentalized as moral justification for new military aggressions. Their tragic situation illustrates the central paradox: a regime claiming to defend an ethnic community actually uses it as a mere tool of its geopolitical strategy, without real consideration for its aspirations, security, or well-being.

This instrumentalization has had absolutely devastating human consequences: more than six million deaths in the DRC since 1996, millions displaced, collapse of state and social structures in eastern Congo, deliberate maintenance of intercommunity tensions in Burundi, and destruction of any prospect for constructive regional cooperation. Beyond these immediate human and material costs, this policy has profoundly poisoned relations between states and communities throughout the Great Lakes region, creating scars that will take generations to heal.

As long as the international community continues to ignore this systematic instrumentalization, to confuse authoritarian stability imposed by force with genuine and lasting peace, and to turn a blind eye to blatant violations of neighboring states' sovereignty, the peoples of the Great Lakes region will remain prisoners of a destructive cycle of manipulation, intercommunity mistrust, and recurring violence.

The future of this crucial region for Central Africa will fundamentally depend on the capacity of states, including and especially Rwanda, to recognize this reality, abandon regional destabilization strategies, restore historical truth without manipulation, and build authentic peace based not on instrumentalized fear and strategic lies, but on transitional justice, mutual respect for sovereignty, and equitable regional cooperation. This will also require Western powers to cease their unconditional support for an authoritarian regime that destabilizes an entire region, and finally accept to see Rwanda as it truly is, rather than through the distorting prism of the 'Rwandan miracle.'

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• Stearns, J. (2022). Understanding the M23 Rebellion in Congo. Congo Research Group, New York University.

• Trefon, T. (2020). Congo's Environmental Paradox: Potential and Predation in a Land of Plenty. London: Zed Books.

• United Nations. (2010). UN Mapping Report on Human Rights Violations in the DRC (1993–2003). Geneva.

• United Nations Security Council. (2016). Final Report of the Group of Experts on Burundi. New York.

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Prepared by:

Sam Nkumi, Chris Thomson & Gilberte Bienvenue

African Rights Alliance, London, UK

African Rights Alliance

Pages

Thursday, 6 November 2025

The Rwandan Regime and the Instrumentalization of Ethnic Divisions in the DRC and Burundi: Critical Analysis of a Regional Geopolitical Strategy