The Doha negotiations, presented as a decisive step towards restoring peace in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), once again revolve around two central proposals: a ceasefire between the Congolese Armed Forces (FARDC), the Wazalendo self-defence groups and the March 23 Movement (M23), and the release of prisoners associated with the latter. For international mediators and certain foreign partners, these measures appear reasonable, aimed at reducing the intensity of the fighting and creating a climate conducive to dialogue.
Yet a
closer examination of the situation demonstrates that these proposals pose
major threats to the sovereignty, security, and stability of the DRC. The
country’s recent history, the painful lessons of previous agreements, and the
well-established strategies of its adversaries all show that conceding on these
points would mean repeating the same mistakes that have allowed Rwanda and its
proxy armed groups to sustain destabilising ambitions. Refusing these
conditions is not an act of obstinacy, but a strategic imperative for an
embattled state.
1. The History of Ceasefires: A Systematic Trap
For
more than two decades, successive Congolese governments have signed ceasefire
agreements with armed groups active in the East. From the Lusaka Agreement in
1999 to the Sun City talks of 2002, and later the Nairobi accords with the CNDP
and M23, each process was framed as a step towards ending violence. Yet in
practice, rebel groups have consistently exploited these pauses for military
gain.
The
pattern is familiar. While the FARDC are ordered to halt operations, the M23
uses the lull to recruit new fighters, reorganise its command structures and
receive weapons, training, and logistical support from Rwanda. Ceasefires, far
from being moments of de-escalation, have functioned as strategic breathing
spaces for rebels.
The
results have been disastrous. The FARDC often find themselves demobilised and
demoralised, while local populations lose faith in the state’s ability to
provide security. From truce to truce, the M23 and its predecessors have
entrenched their control over strategic territories, such as the mineral-rich
areas of North Kivu.
Accepting
another ceasefire in Doha would perpetuate this vicious cycle. Historical
precedent is clear: the M23 has never respected a truce. The DRC must therefore
break with this repetitive and costly logic.
2. The Strategic Paralysis of the FARDC and
Wazalendo
A
ceasefire does more than freeze military activity; it also carries
psychological and political consequences. By imposing a truce on the FARDC and
the Wazalendo, it blunts their vigilance, disrupts their field strategies, and
creates the illusion of imminent peace.
The
experience of the so-called “Washington Agreements” is telling. At the time,
Kinshasa suspended its military efforts in the belief that international
powers—particularly the United States—would intervene decisively to resolve the
crisis. Instead, this reliance on external salvation paralysed the government,
while Congolese civilians endured massacres and displacement.
A
truce negotiated in Doha risks recreating this scenario. The FARDC and
self-defence groups, who have demonstrated remarkable determination in recent
months, would be forced into inaction, leaving the initiative once again to the
M23 and its regional backers.
3. Paul Kagame’s Strategy: “To Talk and Fight”
Rwandan
President Paul Kagame has long perfected a dual strategy often summarised as
“to talk and fight”. It consists of engaging in negotiations while continuing
hostilities on the ground. Through this approach, Kagame sustains an
international image of a reasonable statesman open to dialogue, even as Rwandan
forces, via the M23, wage an undeclared war in Congolese territory.
This
duplicity has several advantages for Kigali. It buys time to strengthen rebel
positions, diverts international attention, and secures de facto recognition of
its influence in the region. Negotiations become not a path to peace, but a
theatre for image management.
The
DRC can no longer afford to be drawn into this charade. Genuine peace cannot be
achieved by indulging Kigali’s duplicity. Refusing both the ceasefire and the
prisoner release means rejecting an approach designed to weaken the Congolese
state from within.
4. The Prisoner Question: A Threat to National
Security
One of
the most dangerous conditions under discussion in Doha concerns the release of
M23-linked prisoners. Many of these detainees are not mere fighters but trained
Rwandan infiltrators arrested inside Congolese territory. Some were apprehended
for espionage, targeted assassinations and orchestrating insecurity in both
rural and urban areas.
To
release them would be to reintroduce highly trained operatives into the
conflict, strengthening the M23’s human resources and directly threatening
civilian populations. This would also send a devastating message domestically:
that the Congolese state capitulates to pressure and cannot protect its
citizens.
The
stakes are therefore both practical and symbolic. Practically, these prisoners
would bolster the M23’s operational capacity. Symbolically, their release would
represent betrayal, eroding already fragile public trust in national
institutions.
5. An Unequal and Dangerous Negotiation
The
Doha talks suffer from a fundamental imbalance. They place a sovereign state,
recognised under international law, on the same level as a rebel movement
sustained by a foreign power. This false equivalence grants the M23 a
legitimacy it does not deserve.
The
M23 is not a representative political actor; it is a proxy force, reliant on
Rwandan funding, weaponry, and political cover. To recognise it as a legitimate
interlocutor is to undermine the very sovereignty of the DRC. It sets a
precedent that armed violence, when sufficiently supported from abroad, can
elevate a group to the status of political actor.
The
DRC must resist this distortion. Negotiating under such terms weakens the
authority of the Congolese state and legitimises aggression. Peace must rest
not on concessions to rebels, but on respect for sovereignty, non-interference,
and the inviolability of borders—principles enshrined in the UN Charter and the
Constitutive Act of the African Union.
6. The American Illusion and Inevitable
Disappointment
A
further danger in the Doha process lies in the ambiguous role of the United
States. Washington presents itself as a neutral arbiter, yet its stance has
been consistently “balanced” between the aggressor (Rwanda) and the victim
(DRC).
On
paper, the US supports UN Security Council resolutions condemning the presence
of Rwandan Defence Forces on Congolese soil. In practice, however, it avoids
applying genuine pressure on Kigali, seeking instead to protect economic and
security partnerships.
This
ambiguity is not new. Since the 1990s, the US has been instrumental in Rwanda’s
military rise, providing political and financial backing. Expecting Washington
to impose a firm solution is therefore an illusion that history has repeatedly
disproved.
The
DRC must draw the correct conclusion: that its security cannot rest on the
goodwill of external powers. It must prioritise its own military capacity,
while building robust alliances with African institutions such as the Southern
African Development Community (SADC) and the African Union.
7. What Alternatives for the DRC?
Rejecting
the Doha conditions does not mean abandoning all political solutions. Instead,
it means establishing realistic, sovereignty-preserving pathways to peace.
Several alternatives are clear:
- Strengthening
national defence: The FARDC and Wazalendo must be reinforced
through improved training, logistical support, and morale-building
measures. A credible deterrent is essential.
- Offensive diplomacy:
Kinshasa must mobilise the African Union, the SADC, and the UN to pursue
targeted sanctions against Rwanda and ensure the conflict is framed
internationally as an act of cross-border aggression, not internal unrest.
- Justice and
accountability: Prisoners must be tried for war crimes,
crimes against humanity, and espionage, whether in Congolese courts or
before international jurisdictions. Their release without due process
would undermine justice.
- National
communication: The government must actively explain its
choices to the population, counter disinformation, and strengthen public
trust in the state as the defender of sovereignty.
These
measures would align the DRC’s response with international law and regional
solidarity, while ensuring that peace efforts are grounded in justice, not
concessions to aggressors.
Conclusion
The
Doha negotiations are not a genuine opening towards peace but a trap that the
DRC must avoid. The ceasefire, presented as a gesture of goodwill, functions
only as a tactical instrument for the M23 and Rwanda to regroup and prepare
future offensives. The release of prisoners, meanwhile, represents a direct
security threat, restoring to the enemy trained operatives whose mission is to
destabilise the DRC further.
Rejecting
these conditions is not an act of radicalism, but a necessity dictated by
historical experience and political realism. The DRC cannot build peace on
concessions that empower aggressors. Instead, it must consolidate its military
strength, reaffirm its sovereignty, build regional alliances, and pursue a
diplomacy that exposes Rwanda’s responsibility in this proxy war.
True
peace will not emerge from illusory truces but from the Congolese state’s
determination to defend its territory, uphold justice, and assert its right to
sovereignty in the face of aggression.
Prepared par :
Sam Nkumi, Chris Thomson &
Gilberte Bienvenue
African Rights Alliance
