Why Peace and Stability Have Been So Difficult to Achieve in the Great Lakes Region Over the Last 30 Years

Why Peace and Stability Have Been So Difficult to Achieve in the Great Lakes Region Over the Last 30 Years

For more than three decades, the Great Lakes Region of Africa—especially Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi, and the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)—has struggled to achieve genuine peace, stability, and regional cooperation. Conflicts have erupted repeatedly, borders have been militarised, and millions of civilians have been displaced or killed. Although historical factors and colonial legacies contribute to much of this instability, the prolonged failures of peace efforts cannot be understood without addressing the behaviour of contemporary leaders, state structures, and regional geopolitics. Authoritarianism, overstaying in power, ethnic favouritism, clientelism, nepotism, and the selfish pursuit of personal and family interests have played a central role in perpetuating instability. At the same time, illegal exploitation of natural resources, the rise of proxy armed groups, and international powers supporting leaders who protect their interests—rather than the interests of citizens—have deepened the crisis.

This essay analyses why peace has been so difficult to achieve, focusing on governance failures, regional power politics, and long-standing structural drivers of conflict.

1. Overstaying in Power and the Crisis of Leadership

One of the most fundamental obstacles to peace in the Great Lakes Region is the persistence of rulers who refuse to leave power. Political leadership in the region has become personalised, entrenched, and sustained through manipulation of constitutions, militarisation, and repression. Two of the most illustrative examples are Yoweri Kaguta Museveni of Uganda and Paul Kagame of Rwanda.

Museveni: Nearly 40 Years in Power

Museveni came to power in 1986 after a guerrilla war, presenting himself as a liberator committed to democracy, security, and social transformation. But over time, he has followed the same authoritarian path he once condemned:

• Repeatedly amending the constitution to remove term limits (2005) and age limits (2017)
• Concentrating power in the presidency and security agencies
• Weakening parliament and the judiciary
• Violently repressing opposition movements such as FDC and the People Power/NUP movement
• Creating a political system increasingly dominated by military elites and personal loyalists

Museveni's long rule has also become increasingly personal and dynastic—designed to ensure that power eventually transfers to his son, Gen. Muhoozi Kainerugaba. Instead of acting as a regional elder statesman who promotes peace, Museveni has become deeply self-interested and consumed by internal political survival. His military interventions in the region—supporting rebel groups in Congo in the late 1990s, clashing with Rwanda in Kisangani, and taking sides in South Sudan—have been driven less by peacebuilding and more by regional influence and economic gain.

Uganda remains under his personal control, and his regime no longer has the moral authority or credibility to act as an impartial peace facilitator. His legacy, rather than regional stability, is increasingly defined by self-preservation, militarisation, and family succession.

Kagame: Another Leader Preparing a Dynastic Future

Rwanda presents a similar trajectory. Kagame has been in power de facto since 1994 and officially since 2000. Despite some economic progress  that benefit largely  a small group of the regime, Kagame has built a highly centralised, tightly controlled authoritarian state. Like Museveni, he has removed term limits and positioned himself to remain in power indefinitely. The political system is characterised by:

• Limited political pluralism
• Systemic repression of dissent
• Surveillance and exile politics
• Elite dominance by individuals linked to the ruling RPF

Kagame is also preparing a dynastic model, with increasing political visibility for his children, especially Ange Kagame. This trend mirrors Museveni's model of personalisation of the state.

Such leadership patterns create deep frustration among citizens who see no legitimate avenues for political participation, power transition, or accountability. This political closure builds long-term instability.

2. Ethnic Favouritism, Clientelism, and Nepotism

Across the region, political power is often based not on citizenship or merit, but on ethnic affiliation and loyalty to ruling elites. This is particularly evident in Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, and parts of eastern Congo. Political systems built on ethnic favouritism create:

• Exclusion of large populations
• Entrenched inequality
• Distrust between communities
• Grievances that fuel armed mobilisation

In Rwanda, power remains heavily concentrated in the hands of a small group of elites predominantly from one region and one historical political network. In Uganda, the military and political hierarchy is dominated by individuals from Museveni's western region and close family allies. In Burundi, political competition along Hutu–Tutsi lines has remained a core source of tension.

Clientelism—where leaders exchange resources, protection, or jobs for political loyalty—reinforces these systems. Nepotism ensures that family members occupy key positions in the security apparatus, economy, or diplomatic posts.

Such governance systems weaken national unity, erode trust in state institutions, and create fertile ground for rebellion when excluded groups seek access to power by force.

3. Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and War Economies

The Great Lakes Region, particularly eastern DRC, contains some of the world's richest deposits of gold, coltan, cobalt, tin, diamonds, and timber. These resources have been at the heart of regional conflict since the 1990s. Instead of benefiting local populations, natural resources have become:

• A source of illicit wealth
• A motivation for foreign military interventions
• A means of financing armed groups
• A driver of corruption among state officials

Uganda, Rwanda, and other regional actors have been repeatedly accused by UN experts, human rights organisations, and international watchdogs of benefiting from the illegal exploitation of Congolese minerals. During the First and Second Congo Wars, Rwandan and Ugandan military officers, along with local rebel groups, engaged in systematic extraction of natural resources.

This war economy has not disappeared. Instead, it has become more sophisticated:

• Exporting gold mined in Congo through Kigali or Kampala
• Financing local militias to control mining zones
• Taxing artisanal miners
• Using companies linked to political elites to transport and sell minerals

As long as conflict brings profit, regional elites have little incentive to support genuine peace. Illegal exploitation fuels the creation of armed groups, undermines peace agreements, and keeps eastern Congo in a perpetual state of insecurity.

4. Proxy Warfare and the Formation of Armed Groups

Another major obstacle to peace is the long-standing practice of governments supporting proxy armed groups in neighbouring countries in order to advance strategic interests. Examples include:

• Rwanda supporting the AFDL in 1996–1997, the RCD in 1998–2003, and the M23 in recent years
• Uganda supporting various rebel groups in Congo during both Congo wars
• Burundi and Rwanda accusing each other of supporting opposition armed groups
• Congolese elites financing tribal militias to maintain political and economic influence

The use of proxies destabilises entire regions, causes mass displacement, and destroys trust between governments. Even when peace agreements are signed, proxy forces remain a tool for bargaining power, making the peace fragile and temporary.

When countries fight indirectly through militias, the region becomes locked in a perpetual cycle of accusation, retaliation, and suspicion. Regional institutions such as the African Union, ICGLR, and EAC have limited authority to enforce political accountability, allowing governments to deny involvement while continuing to arm rebels.

5. International Powers Prioritising Their Own Interests

International actors—Western countries, the UN, and global powers—have played a contradictory role in the region. Instead of supporting democratic governance and human rights, many have backed authoritarian leaders who align with their geopolitical and security interests.

Paul Kagame is one of the most striking examples of this dynamic. Despite credible reports of political repression, involvement in Congo's conflicts, and human rights violations, Rwanda has received strong political and financial support from the United States, the United Kingdom, and other Western allies. These powers see Rwanda as:

• A security partner
• A stabilising force
• A regional ally
• An example of economic reform

As long as Kagame serves the strategic needs of powerful nations—peacekeeping forces, counterterrorism alignment, control of migration—his domestic authoritarianism and regional interventions are tolerated.

Similarly, Museveni has remained in power largely because he serves the security and diplomatic interests of the United States and Europe. Uganda is a major contributor to peacekeeping operations in Somalia (AMISOM/ATMIS), a close security partner of Western intelligence, and a regional military actor. Western governments value his stability more than Uganda's democracy.

This external support encourages leaders to ignore human rights, suppress dissent, and overstay in power because they know they will not face meaningful international consequences.

6. The Accumulation of Frustration and Long-Term Instability

All these factors—selfish leadership, authoritarianism, ethnic exclusion, resource exploitation, and proxy warfare—create a profound sense of frustration among the population. When citizens feel:

• Excluded from political life
• Deprived of economic opportunity
• Exploited by leaders who serve foreign interests
• Repressed for expressing dissent
• Witnessing their countries used as battlegrounds for regional rivalries

they lose faith in peaceful political processes. This environment is fertile ground for:

• Youth radicalisation
• Ethnic mobilisation
• The formation of new rebel movements
• Protests and violent state repression
• Cycles of revenge between communities

The region becomes locked in a cycle where instability sustains authoritarianism, and authoritarianism produces new forms of instability.

Lack of Democracy, Human Rights, and Freedom of Assembly

Another major factor undermining peace and stability in the Great Lakes Region is the systematic absence of democracy, respect for human rights, and freedom of assembly. Governments in Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi, and to some extent the DRC have consistently suppressed political opposition, independent media, and civil society. In Rwanda, for example, prominent opposition leader Victoire Ingabire Umuhoza spent eight years in prison after returning from exile in 2010 to challenge the government through peaceful political means. Many other activists, journalists, and opposition figures—such as Déogratias Mushayidi, Bernard Ntaganda, Kizito Mihigo, and members of the FDU-Inkingi—have been jailed, forcibly disappeared, or subjected to intimidation.

Others have been killed either inside Rwanda or in foreign countries, including assassinations in South Africa, Mozambique, Kenya, and Uganda, often targeting former intelligence officials, political critics, or defectors. The same pattern exists in Uganda, where state repression has intensified against opposition groups such as NUP, with peaceful protesters routinely beaten, arrested, or killed by security forces.

Across the region, peaceful demonstrations are banned or violently dispersed, violating constitutional rights and creating an atmosphere where citizens cannot express grievances or participate in political decision-making. Without freedom of speech, political competition, or peaceful assembly, frustrations build up, pushing some groups to seek change through violent or extra-legal means. The lack of democratic space therefore becomes a direct driver of political instability, social tension, and cycles of conflict that threaten long-term peace in the Great Lakes Region.

Solutions to the Persistent Instability in the Great Lakes Region

Solving the complex crises of the Great Lakes Region requires a combination of political reform, regional cooperation, economic transformation, institutional strengthening, and international accountability. No single measure can bring peace, because the causes of instability are interconnected—authoritarianism feeds regional conflict, illegal resource exploitation fuels armed groups, and the lack of justice creates cycles of revenge.

Below are the major solutions needed to build lasting peace.

1. Democratic Reforms and Respect for Political Freedoms

a. Restore term limits and end the culture of life-long rulers

Ending overstaying in power is essential. Constitutions must be respected, not modified to benefit individuals. Peaceful transfer of power should become a norm in Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi, and the DRC.

b. Free political prisoners and protect freedom of expression

Opposition leaders such as Victoire Ingabire and other political activists, journalists, and civil society members must be released and allowed to participate freely in politics.

c. Allow peaceful demonstrations and free media

Democracy cannot exist without public debate. Governments must stop repressing peaceful protests and stop criminalising dissent. Independent media must be allowed to operate without intimidation.

d. Strengthen parliaments, courts, and local governance

A balance of power reduces dictatorship and ensures that local grievances are addressed before they escalate.

2. Address Ethnic Favouritism, Clientelism, and Nepotism

a. Build inclusive governments

States must represent all communities—not only one ethnic group, region, or political network.

b. Create transparent public-service recruitment systems

Jobs in the army, police, government ministries, and state companies must be based on merit, not ethnicity or loyalty to the ruling elite.

c. Reform security institutions

Security forces must serve the nation—not one ethnic group or political leader.

These measures reduce long-term grievances and help rebuild trust among communities.

3. Economic Reforms and Equitable Development

a. Create jobs, especially for the youth

Unemployment fuels rebel recruitment and criminal networks. Investment in agriculture, energy, technology, and manufacturing is essential.

b. Reduce corruption and improve financial transparency

Public resources must serve citizens, not enrich elites.

c. Promote equitable development across regions

When some regions prosper while others remain neglected, resentment grows and fuels conflict.

4. Ending Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources

a. Regulate and formalise mining

Governments in the region—especially DRC—must formalise artisanal mining, create transparent taxation, and eliminate warlord control of mining sites.

b. Impose sanctions on companies involved in illicit mineral trade

Sanctions must target:

• army officers,
• powerful businessmen,
• political elites,
• multinational companies.

c. Regional mineral certification

A strong mechanism is needed to track the origin of minerals and stop smuggling through neighbouring countries.

Ending the illegal mineral economy is one of the most important steps in achieving peace.

5. Ending Proxy Wars and Support for Armed Groups

a. Enforce strict regional agreements

The ICGLR, AU, and EAC must enforce consequences when states support proxy groups like M23, ADF splinter factions, RED-Tabara, FDLR remnants, Mai-Mai militias, etc.

b. Strengthen border control and intelligence cooperation

Joint border patrols and shared intelligence can help identify and dismantle armed networks.

c. Demobilisation, disarmament, and reintegration (DDR) programs

Former fighters must be reintegrated into society to limit the recycling of rebel groups.

d. Stop using refugees as political weapons

Governments must guarantee refugee protection and stop infiltrating refugee camps with armed elements.

6. Justice, Accountability, and Reconciliation

a. Establish regional tribunals or hybrid courts

Impunity is a major cause of recurring violence. Perpetrators of massacres, assassinations, illegal resource exploitation, and repression must be held accountable—regardless of political position.

b. Create truth and reconciliation processes

Communities need spaces to speak openly about:

• genocide crimes,
• massacres,
• revenge killings,
• ethnic persecution.

Without truth, reconciliation is impossible.

c. Protect witnesses and victims

Many fear reprisals. Protection mechanisms are essential for justice to function.

7. Strengthen Regional Institutions and Cooperation

a. Reform the African Union, EAC, and ICGLR

These institutions often lack teeth. They need:

• enforcement mechanisms,
• rapid intervention capacity,
• clear sanctions for states that fuel conflict.

b. Promote joint development projects

Roads, energy grids, rail lines, and trade systems can bind countries together economically, reducing incentives for conflict.

c. Empower regional civil-society organisations

Grassroots peacebuilders, human rights groups, youth movements, and women's networks must be part of decision-making—not only governments.

8. International Actors Must Change Their Approach

a. Stop supporting authoritarian regimes for strategic interests

Western powers must stop giving unconditional support to dictatorial leaders who repress their populations and destabilise neighbours.

b. Promote consistent human rights standards

The same standards must apply to all countries—whether Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi, DRC, or others.

c. Support democratic transitions, not just military stability

Short-term stability based on authoritarianism creates long-term conflict.

d. Make peacekeeping missions more effective

UN missions must:

• improve civilian protection,
• disrupt armed group financing,
• work with regional mechanisms,
• pressure governments to stop supporting militias.

9. Empower Youth and Civil Society

a. Provide education, skills, and employment opportunities

A region where 60% of the population is under 25 cannot have peace if youth remain excluded.

b. Support local peace initiatives

Dialogue, community policing, and local conflict-resolution mechanisms can reduce violence at the grassroots level.

c. Protect journalists, activists, and human rights defenders

A vibrant civil society helps keep governments accountable and exposes corruption or abuses.

10. Promote Long-Term Cultural and Social Healing

a. Reduce hate speech, ethnic propaganda, and historical manipulation

Education systems should teach inclusive national histories—not ethnic superiority or distorted narratives.

b. Support trauma healing and psychosocial programmes

Millions of people in the region have lived through war, genocide, rape, displacement, and repression. Without healing, trauma becomes a driver of violence.

11. Strengthen the CEPGL (Communauté Économique des Pays des Grands Lacs)

A critical but often forgotten solution is the revival and strengthening of the CEPGL, the regional organisation linking Rwanda, Burundi, and the DRC. Created in 1976, the CEPGL was designed to promote economic integration, free movement of people, shared infrastructure, and mutual security cooperation. However, decades of political tension, war, and mistrust have made it largely inactive. Revitalising the CEPGL would provide a powerful platform for rebuilding regional cooperation and reducing conflict. Strengthening the organisation would require: restoring regular high-level political dialogue; reactivating joint institutions such as the Development Bank of the Great Lakes (BDGL), the Energy Organisation of the Great Lakes (EGL), and the International Institute for Agriculture and Livestock (IRAZ); establishing transparent mechanisms for cross-border trade and resource management; and implementing joint border-security arrangements to prevent the movement of armed groups. A strong CEPGL would help rebuild confidence between member states, promote regional development, reduce economic imbalances, and limit the militarisation of borders. If effectively supported, the CEPGL could become one of the most important pillars for long-term peace, stability, and shared prosperity in the Great Lakes Region.

12. Rwanda's Regional Ambitions and the Self-Proclaimed Role as "Protector of All Tutsi"

Another key driver of instability in the Great Lakes Region is Rwanda's long-standing ambition to project power beyond its borders, particularly into eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Since 1996, the Rwandan government has repeatedly justified military interventions in Congo by claiming to protect its national security from groups like the FDLR, but also by asserting a broader regional responsibility to protect all Tutsi populations, whether in Congo, Burundi, Uganda, or elsewhere. This doctrine—never officially written but consistently invoked in speeches, policies, and intelligence operations—has allowed Rwanda to position itself as the self-appointed guardian of Tutsi communities, especially Congolese Tutsi/Banyamulenge and Rwandophone groups in North and South Kivu.

While community protection is legitimate, the political use of this narrative has generated profound suspicion and hostility among neighbouring states. Many governments view Rwanda's "protector" role as a cover for geopolitical influence, military operations, and economic interests, particularly control of strategic territories, trade routes, and mineral-rich zones. This perception has been reinforced by repeated UN reports documenting Rwandan support to armed groups such as the AFDL (1996–1997), the RCD (1998–2003), and more recently the M23 rebellion, accused of massacres, forced displacement, and creating parallel administrations in eastern DRC.

At the regional level, Rwanda's ambition to shape political outcomes in Congo, influence Burundian politics, and compete with Uganda for strategic control has deepened mistrust among states and made genuine regional integration difficult. For many Congolese communities, Rwanda's narrative of protecting Tutsi populations is perceived not as humanitarian but as territorial ambition, resource exploitation, and political domination. This fuels ethnic tensions, anti-Tutsi sentiment, and mass mobilisation—further destabilising the region. Lasting peace will require dismantling both the ideological claim of ethnic guardianship and the military networks sustained under this doctrine, replacing them with inclusive security agreements that protect all communities equally under international law.

Rwanda Has No Legal or Moral Licence to Kill or Displace People in Other Countries

Rwanda has repeatedly justified its military operations, cross-border incursions, and support for armed groups in neighbouring countries by claiming to protect Tutsi minorities, especially in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo. While the protection of threatened communities is a legitimate humanitarian concern, no state has the right to kill, invade, or forcibly displace populations outside its own territory under the pretext of ethnic protection. International law is absolutely clear on this: the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states must be respected; civilians are protected under international humanitarian law; and the "Responsibility to Protect" (R2P) cannot be used unilaterally by one state to justify military aggression. The idea that Rwanda has a self-granted licence to act as the "guardian of Tutsi populations" across the region is not only politically destabilising but also legally indefensible. It violates core principles of the UN Charter, the African Union Constitutive Act, and the Geneva Conventions. Protecting minority communities must be done through regional cooperation, diplomacy, and international mechanisms—not through proxy militias, invasions, assassinations, or forced displacement. Rwanda's unilateral interventions have caused immense suffering, deepened ethnic tensions, and fuelled cycles of revenge, proving that no country can claim a special ethnic mandate that places it above international law.

Conclusion: A Long-Term Transformation Is Needed

The Great Lakes Region has struggled to achieve peace for 30 years because the underlying political, economic, and security structures are designed to preserve the power of ruling elites rather than protect the well-being of citizens. Leaders who overstay in power—such as Museveni and Kagame—govern through networks of patronage, ethnic favouritism, and personalised authority. Their selfish political strategies undermine trust, weaken democratic institutions, and deny citizens any peaceful path to political change.

Illegal exploitation of natural resources and the use of armed proxies deepen the crisis, creating war economies that benefit a small minority while destroying communities. International powers that support leaders who align with their interests further weaken accountability and allow authoritarian regimes to operate with impunity.

Until leadership changes, institutions become credible, and regional cooperation is based on principles rather than personal or ethnic loyalty, the Great Lakes Region will remain trapped in recurring cycles of conflict. Real peace will require not only ending armed conflict, but dismantling the political and economic systems that profit from instability.

Peace in the Great Lakes Region will not be achieved through military operations or diplomatic statements alone. Durable peace requires:

• democratic transformations
• inclusive governance
• neutral justice systems
• economic fairness
• end of proxy wars
• accountability for human rights abuses
• international honesty

The region must move away from the politics of personal power, ethnic manipulation, and resource plunder toward a future based on institutions, accountability, and citizen rights. Only when leaders prioritise their populations—not their families, ethnic groups, or foreign sponsors—will stability finally take root.

References

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Prepared par :

Sam Nkumi, Chris Thomson & Gilberte  Bienvenue

African Rights Alliance, London, UK